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Labor Law
and the
Race to the Bottom
by Steven L. Wilborn*
Race to the bottom is a frequent theme in American labor-law
scholarship. The basic claim is that economic pressure will result in
races to the bottom that will squeeze out laws and regulations protecting
labor. The argument goes like this:
[Competition between states and nations]

. . .

diminishes the level of

... labor-protective regulations. Companies prefer to produce in legal
environments that offer the least protections for labor and, when
feasible, they shift production to capture the resultant lower labor
costs. As a result, [states and] nations compete for business using
lower labor standards to attract businesses, a dynamic known as
"regulatory competition." Regulatory competition leads non-labor
groups to oppose labor regulation on the ground that business flight
hurts them. Thus regulatory competition can trigger a downward
spiral in which [states and] nations compete with each other for lower

* Judge Harry A. Spencer Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law.
This Article has had a long gestation period, so I have many to thank for comments and
advice. I received valuable feedback from faculty colloquia at the University of Nebraska,
Seton Hall University, and University of Houston and from many individuals including
Rick Edwards, Mark Grimes, Gillian Lester, Richard Moberly, Stewart Schwab, Charlie
Sullivan, and Emily Willborn.
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labor standards while labor, having lost its historic allies

. . .,

is thus

rendered powerless to resist.'
The overwhelming consensus in American legal scholarship is that
races to the bottom are real, strong, and very threatening. Since 2001,
about 85% of labor-law articles discussing race to the bottom have
accepted it, most of them uncritically.2 Only a few articles have
expressed skepticism.'
The strength of this consensus is odd in a number of respects. First,
in other, more empirically driven disciplines, the consensus cuts strongly
in the opposite direction. Since 2001, 70% of the articles mentioning
race to the bottom in economics and political science were skeptical of
the claim, and, whether accepting or rejecting it, none of them treated
the issue uncritically.4 Some articles have claimed that empirically

1. Katherine V.W. Stone, A New Labor Law for a New World of Work: The Case for a
Approach, 28 CoMp. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 565, 571-72 (2007). See
Comparative-Transnational
also Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Labor and the Global Economy: Four Approaches to
TransnationalLabor Regulation, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 987, 992-94 (1995) (arguing that the

race to the bottom is more problematic in labor than in environmental law).
2. This literature survey and the one on social-science literature should be viewed as
suggestive rather than definitive. They are useful because they confirm the conventional
wisdom about the status of the race-to-the-bottom concept in the legal and social-science
literatures. Discussions of race to the bottom in American labor-law scholarship were
searched for in the Westlaw database "Journals and Law Reviews" and the LexisNexis
database "Law Reviews, CLE, Legal Journals & Periodicals, Combined." Two search terms
were used: (1) "race to the bottom" /s labor and (2) "race to the bottom" /p labor. The
phrases "Is" and "/p" restrict the results to those that include the terms "race to the bottom"
and "labor" in the same sentence and paragraph, respectively. These databases were
searched for the years 2001 to 2011. Later, the searches were repeated for sources
published between the end of 2011 through February 28, 2012. The results were
individually examined to determine whether the author(s) subscribed to the race-to-thebottom theory and the length of their analysis (that is, the number of sentences or
paragraphs, or entire article). Articles that merely acknowledged the existence of a race-tothe-bottom theory in labor standards but did not take a position or substantively analyze
the theory were not included in the analysis. Seventy-three articles were identified; sixtyone accepted the race-to-the-bottom hypothesis; of those sixty-one, 62% devoted one
paragraph or less to analysis of the hypothesis, and only 13% provided more than five
paragraphs of discussion. Results and analysis are available from the Author.
3. Interestingly, there tends to be more skepticism about the race-to-the-bottom claim
in labor-law scholarship originating outside of the United States. See, e.g., BOB HEPPLE,
LABOUR LAWS AND GLOBAL TRADE 13-15 (2005) (United Kingdom); Peter Gahan et al.,
Economic Globalization and Convergence in Labor Market Regulation: An Empirical
Assessment, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 703 (2012) (Australia); Brian Langille, What is International Labor Law For?, 3 L. & ETHICS HUM. RTs. 47 (2009) (Canada).
4. Discussion of the race-to-the-bottom theory in social-science scholarship was searched
for in the following databases: Project Muse, Omnifile, Science Direct, JSTOR, and
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there is "no evidence" of a general race to the bottom.' Second, in other
areas of the law where the race-to-the-bottom claim has currency, such
as environmental law and corporate law, there are articles supporting
the basic claim, but there are also leading articles that analyze the issue
extensively and articulate a skeptical view.' However, no major article
like that exists in labor-law scholarship. Third, even apart from these
developments in other areas, there are stories about the evolution of
labor law that are inconsistent with the race-to-the-bottom thesis.
Despite the large number of labor-law scholars and articles, those stories
remain largely untold.
This Article fills this void in American labor-law scholarship. It tells
the stories that are inconsistent with the race-to-the-bottom thesis. One
of the main reasons for the consensus in favor of the race-to-the-bottom
theory is the rhetorical force of the narrative supporting it. It is a

Academic Search Premier. The same searches, process, and analysis were used as
described in note 2, supra. Twenty-three articles were identified: sixteen rejected the raceto-the-bottom hypothesis, over 90% of all the articles contained extensive analysis of more
than five paragraphs, and none of the articles contained less than three paragraphs of
discussion. Results and analysis are available from the Author. For a long list of articles
that find no relationship between low labor standards and either foreign direct investment
or the competitiveness of exports, see Alan Hyde, A Stag Hunt Account and Defense of
TransnationalLabourStandards-A PreliminaryLook at the Problem, Cornell Law School
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 06-008, at 12 n.28 (2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/id=896362. For a good examination of the economic case against the race-to-thebottom theory, see ROBERT J. FLANAGAN, GLOBALIZATION AND LABOR CONDITIONS: WORKING
CONDITIONS AND WORKER RIGHTS IN A GLOBAL EcONOMY (2006).

5. Hyde, supra note 4, at 12 n.28.
6. See Daniel R. Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent
Developments in Delaware's CorporationLaw, 76 Nw. U. L. REV. 913 (1982); Richard L.
Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-to-the-Bottom"
Rationale for FederalEnvironmentalRegulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992).
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powerful and intuitive story.' However, there are other stories that can
be told, and this Article is about those stories.'
These stories are important both for labor-law scholarship and for the
development of labor policy. The law is inherently a narrative-driven
discipline. Labor-law scholars are generally lawyers who build from the
ground up beginning with the stories of individual cases. They are not
generally trained in statistics-based arguments and tend to be skeptical
of them (although this is changing). As a result, the strong and intuitive
narrative in support of the race-to-the-bottom thesis wins by default in
the absence of alternatives. And the thesis, if unchallenged, skews the
debate on very important policy issues. For example, it weakens claims
for aggressive labor regulation and strengthens the notion that the labor

7. In addition to being powerful and intuitive, the narrative is supported by two strong
cognitive biases. First, the human brain indexes facts around stories; facts without stories
are less influential, while facts embedded within stories tend to be remembered. See
generally ROGER C. SCHANK & ROBERT P. ABELSON, SCRIPTS, PLANS, GOALS AND
UNDERSTANDING: AN INQUIRY INTO HUMAN KNOWLEDGE STRUCTURES (1977); Roger C.

Schank & Robert P. Abelson, Knowledge and Memory: The Real Story, in 8 ADVANCES IN
SOCIAL COGNITION 1 (Robert S. Wyer, Jr. ed., 1995). With the race-to-the-bottom theory,

the pro-race story is simple, intuitive, and memorable; the race-skeptical story has yet to
be told well. Second, the costs of labor regulation tend to be more salient than the benefits
of labor regulation. The costs of workers' compensation, for example, occur sooner and are
easier to quantify than the benefits. The costs are there to be counted today, while the
benefits relate to improvements in human health and well-being and depend on the relative
efficiency of workers' compensation compared to other possible systems for dealing with
workplace injuries, such as the market or tort law. See infra note 56. Recent scholarship
has demonstrated that people exhibit systemic biases in favor of more salient information.
See, e.g., Martin Fochmann & Joachim Weimann, The Effects of Tax Salience and Tax
Experienceon IndividualWork Efforts in a FramedFieldExperiment (IZA Discussion Paper
No. 6049), availableat http://ftp.iza.org/dp6049.pdf; Andrew Hayashi et al., Experimental
Evidence of Tax Salience and the Labor-Leisure Decision: Anchoring, Tax Aversion, or
Complexity? (Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 12-14, 2012),
availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract=2067157; David Gamage et al., ExperimentalEvidence
of Tax FramingEffects on the Work/Leisure Decision (2010), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1629919; Emmanuel Saez, Do Taxpayers Bunch at Kink Points? (Aug. 2, 2009),
http://elsa.berkeley.edu/-saez/saezAEJ09bunching.pdf. This salience bias supports the
race-to-the-bottom hypothesis, which focuses on the costs of labor regulation.
8. This Article focuses on the power of the narrative as a primary factor to explain the
strong consensus favoring the race-to-the-bottom theory. Another possible explanation is
that the articles in other disciplines are usually deeply empirical and statistical. It may
be that these articles are not of interest or cannot be well understood by labor-law scholars.
Or, it could be that labor-law scholars have strong ideological screens that make it difficult
to see or uncomfortable to articulate views skeptical of the race-to-the-bottom theory.
These would certainly be interesting ways to think about the consensus. However, they
are not the primary focus of this Article.

20141

RACE TO THE BOTTOM

373

market is just like any other market and, as such, better left alone.'
Thus, a narrative skeptical of the race-to-the-bottom theory can help to
recalibrate the scales used to consider labor regulation." In general
terms, if we believed in the race-to-the-bottom theory a bit less, we
would likely believe in the value of labor regulation a bit more.
Part I of this Article discusses the basic structure of the race-to-thebottom claim. It begins by imagining what labor regulation would be
like in an insulated jurisdiction and then considers how that regulation
would be affected by interjurisdictional competition-it turns out that
the effects are likely to depend on the purpose of the regulation and its
overall economic effects. Part II discusses one of two broad categories
of labor regulation: regulation that creates net value for society. In
theory, it is easy to see how using well-designed labor regulation to
address market failures might produce net value. This Part will provide
examples; the net-value category may cover more labor regulation than
commonly thought. Part III will address the other broad category of
regulation: regulation that imposes a net cost on society. Despite the net
cost, a society may decide to enact this type of regulation for a variety
of reasons, including the goal of a more acceptable distribution of income

9. See, e.g., John J. Donohue III, Employment Discrimination Law in Perspective:
Three Concepts of Equality, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2583, 2595-99 (1994); Daniel R. Fischel,

Labor Markets and Labor Law Compared with CapitalMarkets and CorporateLaw, 51 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1061 (1984).

10. The rhetorical power of the race-to-the-bottom narrative is enhanced because of a
strange-bedfellows confluence of interests. On the one hand, domestic companies can use
the narrative to argue against increased labor regulation, stating that more stringent
regulation will cause employers to migrate to less regulated jurisdictions. At the same
time, labor coalitions may call on the rhetoric to argue for international labor standards,
arguing that such transnational standards are necessary to avoid races to the bottom.
Miles Kahler, Modeling Races to the Bottom, 3 UC SAN DIEGo SCH. INT'L REL. & PAC.
STUD. 27, available at http://irps.ucsd.edu/assets/014/6739.pdf. Given these interests and
the rhetorical force of the race-to-the-bottom argument, the "perception of a [race to the
bottom] may well be more important than whether one actually exists." Peter P. Swire,
The Race to Laxity and the Race to Undesirability:Explaining Failuresin Competition
Among Jurisdictions in Environmental Law, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 67, 104 (1996)
(emphasis omitted); see generally ROBERT 0. KEOHANE & HELEN V. MILNER, INTERNATIONALIZATION AND DOMESTIC POLITICS (1996); RONALD ROGOWSKI, COMMERCE AND COALITIONS:
How TRADE AFFECTS DOMESTIC POLITICAL ALIGNMENTS (1989).

This confluence of interests supporting the race-to-the-bottom narrative may also help
explain the narrative's persistence. If the narrative serves the interests of both camps, no
one has sufficient incentives to articulate and disseminate the contrary position. Cf
Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of InformationallyEfficient
Markets, 70 AM. EcoN. REV. 393 (1980) (explaining that if all relevant information is
already incorporated into market prices then no one has appropriate incentives to invest
in the acquisition of new information).
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and wealth. This Part will also discuss the fate of net-cost regulation in
the face of interjurisdictional competition. While it is true that such
competition may threaten net-cost regulation, this Part will demonstrate
through examples that a race to the bottom is by no means inevitable.
Part IV will discuss four issues that make the race-to-the-bottom
argument even more complicated and contingent.
"Labor regulation" is a large and complex topic. However, I want to
be clear at the beginning that there are parts of "labor regulation,"
broadly construed, that I am not talking about in this Article. Most
importantly, I am not talking about labor regulation arising from
treaties, trade agreements, or other compacts designed to limit
These kinds of agreements are
interjurisdictional competition.n
certainly a policy option available to try to address problems created by
interjurisdictional competition, and they present important issues in
their own right. However, this is an article about the effects of
interjurisdictional competition on labor regulation, not one about the
effectiveness of legal mechanisms designed to limit that competition.
Certainly, this analysis has implications for the necessity and structure
of interjurisdictional agreements dealing with labor issues, as the raceto-the-bottom claim is often cited as one reason for such agreements.12
Again, discussion of those concepts is not the topic of this Article.
Similarly, this Article focuses on labor regulation,not labor conditions.
Labor regulation describes the legal requirements established through
political processes that pursue certain policy objectives. Labor conditions, in contrast, are the actual conditions experienced by workers: their
wages, hours, and other aspects of their jobs. Thus, it may be that
interjurisdictional competition will affect wages, causing them to go up
in some countries and down in others, while not affecting labor
regulation at all, or vice versa." But in either event, this Article's
focus is on labor regulation, not labor conditions.
The goals of this Article are modest. The Article does not claim that
interjurisdictional competition never results in a race to the bottom in
labor law. Instead, it urges circumspection in making race-to-the-bottom
claims. This Article provides as-yet untold narratives to support the
social-science evidence indicating that the most prudent approach to the

11. When the interjurisdictional competition is between states or provinces, this
limitation would exclude consideration of federal regulation.
12. See, e.g., Preamble to the Constitution of the International Labour Organization,
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/fp=1000:62:0::NO:62:P62_LISTENTRIEID:2453907
:NO ("[The failure of any nation to adopt humane conditions of [labor] is an obstacle in the
way of other nations which desire to improve the conditions in their own countries. . ...
13. For discussion of this point, see infra text accompanying note 38.
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race-to-the-bottom claim is not the current one of uncritical acceptance,
but instead one of cautious skepticism.
I.

ISLANDS AND RACES: THE STRUCTURE OF THE RACE-TO-THE-

BoTToM CLAIM
On its face, the race-to-the-bottom argument is simple and straightforward: labor regulation is expensive, and because globalization puts
pressure on costs, it will weaken labor regulation." This claim aligns
with our basic intuitions about how competition works, and in large part
because of that, it has great rhetorical force. Upon examination, it turns
out that the race-to-the-bottom theory is not one relatively simple claim,
but a set of complicated and interrelated ones. First, it requires us to
imagine what labor regulation would be like in the absence of globalization. This is a hypothetical exercise in a world that has been globalized
since the beginning of the industrial era,15 but it is necessary to make
sense of the race-to-the-bottom claim. Otherwise, one cannot separate
out the effects of globalization, nor evaluate whether the direction is up
or down. Second, we need to examine the precise ways in which
globalization will impose pressure for change. Will it be the same for all
labor regulation? Will globalization always point to the bottom, or will
there also be upward pressure sometimes? Third, we need to ask how
the players will respond to this pressure. How will firms respond and
how, in turn, will governments respond to the firms' reactions? Finally,
we need to ask how fast these responses will occur. The claim, after all,
is that a "race" will occur. So how fast will we circle this track? This
Part will examine these issues and will explore the basic structure of the
race-to-the-bottom claim.
Let us begin with an island jurisdiction that is completely cut off from
the rest of the world and has an abundance of all that is necessary for
a vibrant economy. The island has schools, natural resources, skilled
and unskilled laborers, and capital for investment; everything, except
the ability to interact with other jurisdictions. Of course, there is no
such jurisdiction, certainly not in the modern world. However,

14. The race-to-the-bottom theory is a claim about interjurisdictional competition. The
competition can occur between many different types of jurisdictions: cities, states, regions,
and nations. The main points of this Article are general ones that apply to the race-to-thebottom claim in all of these contexts. However, the principal example used will relate to
competition between countries, and "globalization" will be the word used to indicate greater
competition.
15. For an interesting and insightful review of international connections between
Europe and the United States in the first half of the twentieth century, see DANIEL T.
RODGERS, ATLANTIC CROSSINGS: SOCIAL POLITICS IN A PROGRESSIVE AGE (1998).
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imagining one is necessary to set a baseline for the race-to-the-bottom
claim. To make any sense of a "race" to the "bottom," we need to know
where we are starting from.
Some might argue that no labor regulation would be required on this
island. Employers would offer jobs at compensation levels sufficient to
attract employees with certain skills. The compensation would be.equal
to the marginal productivity of each employee. If the compensation were
more than the employees' marginal productivity, the employers would go
out of business. If it were less, other competing employers would pay
more, and the employer would not be able to attract a competent
workforce. Employees would sort into jobs appropriate for their skills by
taking into account factors such as the risk of injury, the amenities
provided (for example, an office with a view of the mountain peaks), and
so forth. If employees wanted jobs with a lower risk of injury or more
amenities, employers would provide them by investing in job safety or
amenities, but employees would have to pay for them by accepting lower
wages to ensure that their total compensation (wages plus safety or
wages plus amenities) stayed equal to their marginal productivity. So
everything would be perfect without any labor regulation. Employers
would get the employees they need at the "right" price, and employees
would receive fair value for their labors (an amount equal to their
marginal productivity) through the combination of wages and amenities
they prefer. We might think of this island as "Chicago.""
However, "Chicago" is an unlikely jurisdiction. Even on the island,
there is likely to be labor regulation for a number of different reasons.
First, regulation might arise when it can provide value that employers
and employees are unlikely to be able to produce on their own. As I will
discuss in more detail later, several common types of labor regulation
may fall into this category, such as workers' compensation (which,
among other things, may be able to produce quicker, more certain
payments for injuries at a lower cost)" and employee-leave requirements (which can solve an employer-side, first-mover problem)."
Because these types of laws produce value, both employers and
employees should support them; they can make everybody better off.

16. For examples of important articles arguing that employer and employee interests
might be best served on an island like "Chicago," see Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the
Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947 (1984); Andrew P. Morriss, Bad Data, Bad
Economics, and Bad Policy: Time to Fire Wrongful DischargeLaw, 74 TEx. L. REV. 1901
(1996); Richard A. Posner, An EconomicAnalysis of Sex DiscriminationLaws, 56 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1311 (1989).

17.
18.

See discussion infra Part IL.A
See discussion infra Part I.B.
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How the benefits are distributed across employees, employers, and
society is uncertain. That will depend on factors, such as the level of
unionization, the supply of and demand for workers with certain skills,
and the level of competition in the particular industries affected. There
is a surplus to be divided, however, so one might expect to see these
types of laws." I refer to this category of laws as "net-value labor
regulation."
Second, regulation may arise for reasons other than the net value they
create for society. One example of this might be regulation designed to
ameliorate social disparities of various types. Minimum-wage laws, for
instance, might be enacted with the goal of protecting low-skilled
workers. If these laws arise because of a market failure, they may
provide extra value that the parties cannot produce on their own. If that
is the case, these would be net-value labor regulations and fall into my
first category. Thus, for my purposes, the assumption here is that these
laws do not produce extra value; instead, they redistribute income from
one group to another with either no gain or a net loss to employers and
employees overall.20 Despite this net cost, these types of laws may
arise for a variety of reasons. As I will discuss later, they may arise to
enhance social and political stability, to pursue certain moral goals, or
for other reasons. Here, by definition, there will be winners and losers.
Those in the targeted group receiving the minimum wage will come out
ahead. How the losses will be distributed is uncertain and will depend
on many factors. However, the costs must and will be distributed in
some fashion across employers, employees, taxpayers, and consumers.
I refer to this category as "net-cost labor regulation."21

19. This is not to say that these laws are inevitable. For an interesting theoretical
discussion of barriers to net-value regulations, see Daron Acemoglu, Modeling Inefficient
Institutions, in ADVANCES INECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS 341-80 (Richard Blundell et

al. eds., 2006).
20. I am assuming here that minimum-wage laws are net-cost to help me explore the
general issue of labor regulation that falls into that category. I am not making any
assertions about whether minimum-wage laws actually protect the groups they are
intended to protect or whether those benefits exceed the costs of the regulation. Those
issues are not the subject of this Article; they have been explored elsewhere. See, e.g.,
DAVID CARD & ALAN B. KRUEGER, MYTH AND MEASUREMENT: THE NEw ECONOMICS OF THE

MINIMUM WAGE 276-77 (1995); Daniel Shaviro, The Minimum Wage, the Earned Income
Tax Credit,and Optimal Subsidy Policy, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 405 (1997).
21. There are many paths through which net-value and net-cost labor regulation could
be enacted. See, e.g., infra note 134 and accompanying text. This Article is not a
compilation of every possible type of labor regulation. Instead, it analyzes how the two
major categories of labor regulation-net-value and net-cost-interact with the race-to-thebottom hypothesis.
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Both net-benefit and net-cost labor regulation can arise in a variety of
contexts. For example, if our island is a federal state like the United
States, any of these types of regulation could occur as subnational
legislation (in the United States, for example, as state legislation) or it
could occur as national legislation. If it were subnational legislation,
legislation on any particular topic may take different forms in different
subnational units.
Similarly, the legislation, either national or
subnational, could be drafted to apply to only particular employers or
workers. For example, it might apply only to fast-food restaurants or
automobile-assembly plants.
As this discussion suggests, "labor regulation" is a complex and
multifaceted topic. In later parts of this Article, I will address labor
regulation in more detail. This Part discusses the basic structure of the
race-to-the-bottom claim; for that purpose, this less detailed, general
description should suffice.
The central question presented by the race-to-the-bottom claim is how
labor regulation on our island would change if, instead of being
completely isolated, it were located in an ocean of other islands that
could trade with each other. For present purposes, the precise nature
of the interjurisdictional competition does not matter a great deal. The
competition may occur because employers can move their plants to
islands that offer little or no labor regulation; or the competition may
occur when employers who are already on lower-regulation islands send
their goods to islands with more regulation, thus threatening regulation
and labor conditions on the higher-regulation islands. On some islands,
maybe both occur, with the first type of competition occurring in some
industries and the latter in other industries. Whether and how much
these things occur occur is important to the race-to-the-bottom argument
because these economic factors drive the race.22 However, the precise
way in which the competition is manifested is not important to the
general claims made about a race to the bottom. The general claim is
that this kind of global competition, however manifested, will place
enormous downward pressure on labor regulation.

22. Debora L. Spar & David B. Yoffie, A Race to the Bottom or Governance from the
Top?, in COPING WmTH GLOBALIZATION 31,32 (Aseem Prakash & Jeffrey A. Hart eds., 2000).

Spar and Yoffie have pointed out that races to the bottom can only occur if (a) "border
controls are minimal" and (b) "regulation and factor costs differ across national markets."
Id. If those conditions are present, then a race is most likely to occur when (a) "products
or key inputs are homogenous," (b) "cross-border differentials are significant," (c) "sunk
costs are minimal," and (d) "transaction costs are minimal." Id. These factors imply, and
Spar and Yoffie argue, that races to the bottom will not be uniform or unidirectional across
industries and countries. Id. That claim is consistent with the thesis of this Article;
however, I address the issue with a greater focus on law and regulation.
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Net-value labor regulation challenges the most basic claim of the raceto-the-bottom thesis, that is, that all labor regulation imposes costs that
employers will seek to avoid. By definition, net-value labor regulation
confers net benefits on society. So where would we be more likely to see
it, on economically isolated islands or islands in competition? In both,
there would be economic pressure to enact this type of regulation. It is
precisely this type of pressure that makes islands named "Chicago"
unlikely to exist. On an island, the absence of this type of labor
regulation would mean that certain goods might be more expensive than
they would need to be, that employers might have somewhat lower
profits, or that workers would make slightly less money than they would
otherwise (or, probably, all three in some uncertain combination). The
consequences would be more severe, however, when there is interjurisdictional competition. If some of the benefits lost went into the cost of
goods because a particular jurisdiction did not have these regulations,
the jurisdiction would lose out to others that had the regulations and as
a result were able to produce the goods more cheaply. So the losses
would be compounded. If the lost benefits were felt by firms in their
profits, then the ability of the jurisdiction's firms to attract capital would
be jeopardized by the relative attractiveness of similar but more
profitable firms elsewhere. If the lost benefits were translated into lower
wages and benefits, workers might consider moving away. Even if
workers did not think about moving, they would still see workers who
are very similar to them on other islands doing better than they are.
Because the consequences of failing to have net-value labor regulation
are more severe in interjurisdictional competition than on an isolated
island, we should see more of this type of regulation when there is
competition. The prediction here is the opposite of the standard
prediction. Instead of a race to no regulation, there will be a race to
more regulation, at least more net-value regulation.2 3
It is worth noting that this aspect of the race-to-the-bottom argument
depends on a general premise that would be discomfiting to its
proponents who, in general, tend to favor labor regulation. The premise
that the costs of labor-regulation always exceed benefits is the same
premise that would result in an island named "Chicago." If one believes
in Chicago, then one should believe the race-to-the-bottom argument. If
one believes that labor regulation can solve market flaws and in so doing
provide real benefits to society, then the increased competitiveness of

23. Even if regulation benefits society overall, this does not mean that all firms will
benefit, and those that do not may still begin a race. I will discuss this issue later. See
infra Part IV.B.
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globalization should produce pressures in the opposite direction, towards
more and better net-value labor regulation.
In contrast to net-value labor regulation, net-cost labor regulation will
be threatened by interjurisdictional competition. By definition, the
benefits of this type of labor regulation do not exceed its costs. As a
result, a jurisdiction that enacts net-cost labor regulation will be in
roughly the same position as one that fails to enact net-value labor
regulation-it will be a poorer island. Under global competition, these
effects will be magnified, so there will be more pressure not to enact, or
to repeal, net-cost labor regulation.
The question is whether net-cost labor regulation would wither and
die, as predicted by the race-to-the-bottom hypothesis, or whether some
of it might survive. My claim is that some of it might survive. Consider
two possible situations in which a jurisdiction might enact net-cost labor
regulation to protect low-income workers. First, consider one that enacts
a law to redistribute income to low-wage workers, such as a minimumwage law or a wage-subsidy law. I am assuming this is net-cost labor
regulation within my terminology, in the sense that its benefits do not
exceed its costs.' Nevertheless, for a variety of reasons, a jurisdiction
might enact such a law-for example, to reduce the likelihood of costly
social and political instability. If this is the reason for such a law's
enactment, the jurisdiction might be making the calculation that this
cost is a decent investment in the kind of social and political environment that fosters investment and productivity." How would a lowwage policy enacted for these reasons fare in global competition?
Assuming the premises are correct, 26 a net-cost labor regulation enacted
for this reason should fare very well. Following this reasoning, if these
regulations can be properly calibrated, one might expect to see more of

24. Again, this is an assumption, not an assertion.
25. See, e.g., Alberto Alesina & Roberto Perotti, Income Distribution, Political
Instability, and Investment, 40 EUR. ECON. REV. 1203, 1225-26 (1996) (concluding that
income inequality increases social and political instability, which, in turn, significantly
reduces investment); Geoffrey Garrett, Global Markets and National Politics: Collision
Course or Virtuous Circle?, 52 INT'L ORG. 787, 789, 798 (1998) (agreeing with Alesina and
Perotti that reducing inequality stimulates growth through social stability). Of course, this
may be only a broader way of defining the benefits of such a law, so maybe it flips from the
net-cost category to the net-value category of labor regulation. So, in a way, it may be
cheating to call this net-cost labor regulation if this broader assessment of benefits makes
it have net value. However, this previews the problem presented by the need to evaluate
cost and benefits over time, which I discuss later. See infra note 134.
26. The premises are (a) that it was enacted for this reason, (b) that a reduction in
social inequality actually does foster social and political stability, and (c) that the
regulation was calibrated properly so that the price of the redistribution was less than the
value of the increased stability.
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them when there is global competition. Without these regulations, the
economy will suffer from extra and avoidable social and political
instability, and there will be no way for employers and employees to
avoid this instability.7 In competition, employers and employees could
escape to other jurisdictions that have these regulations and reap the
rewards of stability. Consequently, jurisdictions would have more
incentive to provide labor regulations likely to produce this stability
under competition than they would as isolated islands.28
There is another reason a jurisdiction might want to enact a low-wage
policy such as a minimum-wage or wage-subsidy law that has nothing
to do with this kind of instrumentalist thinking. It might want to enact
a low-wage policy because its populace prefers a more egalitarian
society.29 This issue arises because of disjunctions between political
and economic decision making. In broad outline, it is possible for a
populace to enact a minimum-wage law to satisfy its preference for
equality if the majority of the populace is in favor. Economic decision
making, on the other hand, is much more individualized. On an island,
employers who either disagree with the law or whose business is
adversely affected by the law can take certain steps, such as reducing
employment levels and investing in other types of businesses. However,
they cannot escape. When there is interjurisdictional competition,
employers can go to other jurisdictions that do not have such a law. The
question for us is whether this dynamic will put so much pressure on
redistributive labor regulations that they will disappear.
In theory, there are many reasons such laws might survive even in the
face of interjurisdictional competition. First, the amount of pressure will
partially depend on how many employers will leave (or threaten to leave)
because of the law. I will discuss this in more detail later, but for a
variety of reasons, the movement is unlikely to be universal and swift:

27. This concept is analogous to other areas in which a lack of oversight and regulation
has resulted in worrisome instability. See, e.g., Robert B. Ahdieh, Imperfect Alternatives:
Networks, Salience, and InstitutionalDesign in FinancialCrises, 79 U. CIN. L. REv. 527
(2010); Bruce E. Aronson, The Financial Crisis One Year Later: Proceedings of a Panel
Discussion on Lessons of the FinancialCrisisand Implications for RegulatoryReform, 43
CREIGHTON L. REv. 275 (2010); Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the FinancialCrisis,and
Corporate Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 265 (2012).
28. This example raises issues that will be discussed in more detail later, including: (1)
determining the appropriate time frame for evaluating the social value of a labor
regulation, see infra Part IV.A, and (2) measuring social benefits, see infra Part IV.B.
29. Minimum-wage and wage-subsidy laws, of course, do not produce very egalitarian
societies. However, I use this as a simple placeholder for the complicated mix of
preferences that might result in such laws, for example, requiring some minimum level of
compensation for work, to avoid seeing homeless people on the streets, or to avoid other
social-welfare payments.
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some jobs cannot be moved; even if movable, the costs of the move may
be high; some products cannot be imported; and the employer may agree
with the purpose of the law.o
Second, when employers do leave, the particular jurisdiction may not
view that as such a bad thing. Some jurisdictions may traffic in lowincome labor; others may invest more in human capital and hope for
more. A jurisdiction in the latter category may not mourn the departure
of an employer better suited for the former. More generally, jurisdictions
may become more specialized because of global competition than they
are able to be as separate islands. When that occurs, there may be a
Tieboutian-like sorting.a' In short, some islands may be better suited
to low-income labor than others.32
Third, there are a number of possible steps to lessen the incentives for
employers to leave. For example, fiscal instruments (such as taxes)
could be used to shift costs away from the most mobile employers, or
alternatively, monetary instruments (such as a currency devaluation)
could be used to offset worries about competitiveness in global markets." In sum, even though distributional labor regulation raises labor
costs overall (by definition), the connection between those costs and the
ultimate fate of this type of regulation in the face of global competition
is long, complicated, and uncertain.
Labor regulation designed to favor politically powerful groups is
another type of regulation where overall costs exceed benefits." Thus,

30. See infra note 39.
31. See generally Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures,64 J. POL.
ECON. 416 (1956).
32. Basic comparative-advantage analysis indicates that islands may specialize in
particular types of labor. For example, assume the workers of Island A are ten times more
productive than those of Island B in high technology and three times more productive in
low technology. Although Island A has an absolute advantage in both areas, comparativeadvantage theory holds that a likely outcome is that Island A will produce only hightechnology goods and Island B will produce only low-technology goods. Island A's workers
will demand too high a wage to permit them to work in low technology, while Island B's
workers will not be productive enough to compete in high technology. See, e.g., TYLER
COWEN & ALEX TABARROK, MODERN PRINCIPLES: MACROECONOMICS 383-87 (2010). For a
popular explanation, see PAUL KRUGMAN, POP INTERNATIONALISM 57-59 (1996). See also

Gianmarco I.P. Ottaviano et al., Immigration,Offshoring andAmericanJobs(Nat'l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16439, 2010), available at http://www.nber
.org/papers/w16439 (stating that offshoring creates shifts in domestic labor away from
manual and routine jobs to those requiring greater communication skills).
33. This will be discussed in more detail later. See infra notes 145-50 and accompanying text.
34. A central message ofthe public-choice literature is that small, cohesive groups have
a disproportionate influence on public policy. See generally JAMES M. BUCHANAN &
GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
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such regulation will be threatened by globalization, just as in the netcost regulation previously discussed, and analysis of the two types of
regulation will mirror each other. Political regulation also leads to a
type of stability (political stability), and not all employers will be
affected by its costs. Any adverse effects can be ameliorated through
fiscal measures, monetary measures, or both. The difference is that
everyone except its politically powerful beneficiaries would likely cheer
the demise of political regulation, although many would worry about the
fate of other types of net-cost labor regulation. This muddies the basic
race-to-the-bottom argument even more. In addition to its prediction of
less labor regulation, the claim also has a normative aspect: the race to
the bottom is unfortunate. Yet, if it takes with it costly regulation that
is in place primarily for political reasons, that may not be bad. Thus,
the claim must be that the pressures creating the race to the bottom will
hit "good" regulation (such as minimum-wage laws) harder than they
will hit "bad" regulation (such as political regulation). The contours of
that argument are unclear at best.
Finally, let us consider a couple of the contexts in which labor
regulation might arise. Consider first a federal state in which labor
regulation in a particular area occurs at a subnational level. In the
United States, examples of this would include workers' compensation
and common law limitations on employment at will. To what extent
would globalization put extra pressure on these types of labor regulation? The point is that these regulations have already been through the
crucible of interjurisdictional competition and, somehow, have survived.
In this context, the race-to-the-bottom claim must be that competition
from outside jurisdictions is in some way more severe or disruptive than
competition from subnational jurisdictions."
This claim has intuitive appeal in a world where the difference in
wages between any two states in the United States is much narrower
than the difference in wages between any state and those in, for
example, China. Although the magnitude of the wage difference may
have an important effect on labor conditions, its effect on labor

DEMOCRACY (Ann Arbor Paperbacks: Univ. Mich. Press 1962); DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP
P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991); DANIEL A. FARBER
& ANNE JOSEPH O'CONNELL, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAw
(2010); DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 111 (2003); MAXWELL L. STEARNS & TODD J.
ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS IN LAW (2009). In the labor context,

these groups might be industry workers, large employers, or unions intent on benefiting
themselves or certain workers. In this case, the regulations produce losses to society
overall and to particular groups, but public-choice dynamics result in labor regulation that
benefits a small, cohesive group enough to overcome these disadvantages.
35. For more discussion of this, see infra text accompanying notes 36-38.
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regulation is much less clear. That is, in this example, the difference
may tend to pull the wages of some workers down, whereas its effect on
workers' compensation or unemployment-insurance laws is much less
clear. This is because the forces affecting labor conditions are not the
same as the forces affecting labor regulation. For labor conditions, the
classic economic model is that countries will specialize in areas where
they have abundant resources.36 So in our example, China will focus
on goods requiring low-skilled labor and the United States will focus on
goods requiring more highly skilled labor. For low-skilled labor, the
model predicts a convergence of wages with those in China going up
faster than those in the United States.37 Thus, the general prediction
is relatively straightforward-increased low-wage competition should
decrease the relative labor conditions (wages) of similar workers in the
United States. There are many debates about how this process works
and how smoothly transitions can occur." Even so, that model for
labor conditions does not apply very cleanly to labor regulation.
Consider, for example, something like workers' compensation, and
assume for the moment that the regulation is net-value labor regulation.
Given this, a particular state, say Nebraska, will be in a better
competitive position with workers' compensation than without it,
regardlessof the level of wages elsewhere. Whether the wages elsewhere
are high or low, workers' compensation helps Nebraska's competitiveness; eliminating workers' compensation would hurt Nebraska. Thus,
the fate of labor regulation depends not on the labor conditions
elsewhere, but rather on whether it is net-value regulation within
Nebraska. If it is, it will be more likely to survive; if not, it will be at
risk. However, the principal point here is that in a federal system,
Nebraska's workers' compensation system has already been through the
crucible of interjurisdictional competition, even before China entered the
picture. Competition with New York, California, and North Dakota

36.
37.

See supra note 32.
This process is slowed because wages tend to be rigid downward. See, e.g., Joseph

E. Stiglitz, Theories of Wage Rigidity, in KEYNES' EcONOMIC LEGACY: CONTEMPORARY

ECONOMIC THEORIES 153 (James L. Butkiewicz et al. eds., 1986); Carl M. Campbell III &
Kunal S. Kamlani, The Reasons for Wage Rigidity: Evidence From a Survey ofFirms, 112
Q.J. EcON. 759 (1997); Jan Babecky et al., Downward Nominal and Real Wage Rigidity:
Survey Evidence from EuropeanFirms (Eur. Cent. Bank, Working Paper No. 5159, 2009),
availableat http://ssm.com/abstract-id=1499004.
38. See Hongbin Cai & Daniel Treisman, Does Competition for Capital Discipline
Governments? Decentralization,Globalization, and Public Policy, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 817,
818 (2005) (stating that competition between regions or countries with markedly different
endowments of natural resources, human capital, or infrastructure will occur unevenly and
uncertainly).
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pushed Nebraska to calibrate its workers' compensation system properly.
Additionally, if the workers' compensation system is calibrated properly
to make it as net-value as possible, then the entrance of one more
competitor should not be as disruptive.
The precise nature of the labor regulation at issue is another
important part of the context. Consider, for example, a minimum-wage
law that applies only to hairstylists or counter workers at fast-food
restaurants." What effect would global competition have on a labor
law that applies only to goods or services that are largely insulated from
interjurisdictional trade?4 0 The benefits of the law within the jurisdiction will be the same after the entrance of foreign competitors, that is,
the hairstylists and local counter workers will receive higher wages.
However, with global competition some of the costs of the law will now
be exported, and now foreign employers may bear some of these extra
costs." In essence, the jurisdiction is able to retain all of the benefits
of the law while exporting a portion of the costs. Thus, all other things
being equal, global competition may increase the incidence and
stringency of such laws.42
This Article challenges the race-to-the-bottom claim that the pressure
of global competition on labor regulation is always universally downward. Instead, the claim here is that global competition may increase
or strengthen labor regulation for a variety of reasons. As presented,

39. Haircuts are the prototypical example of non-tradable goods. As with most
concepts, this one gets very sticky in its details. On the one hand, some types of goods and
services may be more tradable than commonly thought. For example, fast-food servers
would seem to be a category requiring local workers, and yet, technology has permitted
some tasks to be exported. Matt Richtel, The Long-Distance Journey of a Fast-FoodOrder,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2006, at D11 (reporting that drive-through orders at some fast-food
restaurants are routed to call centers far away). On the other hand, some goods and
services may not be viewed as perfect substitutes because they are produced in particular
countries. COWEN & TABARROK, supra note 32, at 418-19.
40. Goods are rendered non-tradable due to three primary constraints: (1) transportation costs may be too high to permit trade (for example, trade in cement); (2) some goods
and services simply must be provided locally (for example, haircuts); and (3) legal barriers
to trade (for example, tariffs or quotas). COWEN & TABARROK, supra note 32, at 418-19.
41. There are three basic ways in which the costs of the minimum-wage law might be
distributed: some hairstylists and counter employees may lose their jobs, consumers may
pay more, the profit margins of employers may be reduced, or some combination of all three
might occur. To the extent that the extra costs reduce employers' profits, foreign employers
would share them.
42. Of course, as with all things economic, all other things may not be equal. Changes
in the prices of non-tradable goods may have knock-on effects in areas such as exchange
rates and trade deficits. See Carlos A. Vgh, Non-Tradable Goods & Relative Prices, in
OPEN ECONOMY MACROECONOMICS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2013).
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this is only a broad theory. The next Part analyzes some of these
possibilities in more detail.
II. THE VALUE OF LABOR REGULATION
In theory, net-value labor regulation should fare well in the global
environment; in fact, it should grow and thrive because its extra value
will be even more important as competition increases. This part
provides examples of labor regulation that may fall into the net-value
category; however, one must be humble about such claims. This part
will also discuss why it is extremely difficult to evaluate the net value
of labor regulation. However, it is clear that one of the pillars of the
race-to-the-bottom claim is flawed: it is not true that all regulation
clearly has negative net value and is destined to fall to global competition.
A.

Injured Workers: Social Insurance
Erickson was employed by the railway company as a section hand and
was engaged in his work repairing the road-bed of the railroad near
Fremont, when a fast passenger train approached and he stepped aside
to let it pass. As the train passed him a large piece of coal fell from
the tender of the locomotive, struck the ground near him and broke
into smaller pieces, one of which flew towards him, striking him and
causing a fracture of the leg."'
I suppose we are all in favor of workmen's compensation . ....

When Lars Erickson was injured in 1894 there was a system for
resolving workplace injuries-the common-law tort system for resolving
accidents generally.4 5 Using that system, Erickson filed a lawsuit, won,
However, to win, he had to overcome several
and recovered $1,625.
significant legal hurdles. First, he had to prove that the employer was
negligent in permitting the lump of coal to fall from the tender." The
Supreme Court of Nebraska held that he had proven enough to permit

43. Union Pac. R.R. v. Erickson, 59 N.W. 347, 347 (Neb. 1894).
44. N.Y. State Bar Association, Proceedings of the Thirty-Fifth Annual Meeting 442
(1912). The statement was made as the bar association considered a proposal for an
amendment to the state constitution designed to ensure that a system of workers'
compensation would be constitutional.
45. Erickson, 59 N.W. at 350 (discussing the distinction between the civil law and
common law).
46. Id. at 347.
47. Id.
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the jury to find negligence, which it had, through evidence that the
tender was filled high, limited precautions were taken to ensure that the
coal was secured properly, and protective railings were placed around
the tenders only after the accident.48 Second, Erickson had to prove
that his own negligence did not contribute to his injury.49 The court
determined that there was "no room for doubt" that, although he
necessarily had to be somewhat close to the tracks, he was far enough
away to avoid any "ordinary danger" from a passing train "properly
loaded."so Third, he had to prove that he had not assumed the risk of
such an injury by working for the railroad." The court ruled he had
not." Erickson was a section hand repairing road-beds; he did not
know about the risks from stacking coal in tenders. Finally, he had to
overcome the fellow-servant rule, which generally prevented employees
from recovering because of the negligence of other employees."
However, the court held that the rule did not apply in this case because
there was no "consociation in the same department of duty or line of
employment" between Erickson and the negligent employees. 54 The
company was too big to hold Erickson responsible for the mistakes of all
the railroad's employees."5
Lars Erickson's experience was not typical. Most injured workers at
that time never filed suit, or when they did, they lost. Even if they won,
they did not win much." Margaret Baxter lost in 1894 when she tried
to recover for the death of her thirty-three-year-old husband, George,
who was run over by a railroad car when his foot got caught in the rails.
George knew the tracks were dangerous and, therefore, had assumed the

48.

Id. at 348.

49. Id. at 347.
50. Id. at 348.
51. Id. at 350.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 349.
54. Id. at 350.
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., RODGERS, supranote 15, at 246 (explaining that in Pittsburg in 1906 and
1907, 25% of families of workers killed on the job received nothing, and another 32%
received no more than $100, burial expenses only); JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL
REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN
LAW 43-70 (2004) (providing a rich description of the problems tort law had in dealing with
the rise of industrial accidents during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries);
Lawrence M. Friedman & Jack Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law of Industrial
Accidents, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 50, 66 (1967) (explaining that most families in New York and
Wisconsin received no compensation for fatal workplace injuries, recoveries awarded were
small and took a long time, and litigation expenses consumed about half of the awards).
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risk of death." Anthony Yost, a twenty-year-old section hand, failed
to recover for his injuries when he was struck by a train engine. Yost
knew trains ran on the tracks, and he failed to look before crossing the
tracks. His own contributory negligence meant he could not recover from
the railroad." Ida L. Krayenbuhl failed to recover for the death of her
husband, John, when he was struck by a train while trying to remove a
handcar and railroad tie from the tracks. The train may have blown a
warning signal, and if so, the railroad was not negligent. This was the
result even though Krayenbuhl's efforts avoided a train wreck that may
have cost many lives." As the Supreme Court of Nebraska pointed out,
his "conduct was not negligence; it was heroism."60 If the railroad was
not negligent, however, it did not need to pay for heroism. In Nebraska
in 1896, heroism at work was laudable but not usually compensable.
What happened next is a familiar story: what to do about injured
workers became one of the most important and debated issues of the
first quarter of the twentieth century. After a brief feint towards
employer-liability statutes, which made the tort system more amenable
to injured workers,6 1 the country turned to workers' compensation
statutes as the solution to the problem, and that solution remains the
predominant one today.62
Most of this story is both somewhat misleading and not central to our
purposes. The story may be misleading because it makes it seem as if
workers' compensation, was the obvious and virtually preordained
solution to this complex problem. As John Fabian Witt stated, "to move
[from the crisis of worker injuries] to workmen's compensation is to jump
to the end of the story, to tell it backward from its conclusion."' Yet,
that is not what really happened. Instead, again in Witt's words, the
crisis "precipitated a scramble for alternatives to the law of torts among
working-class families seeking protections against the mounting risks of
injury and death."64 I would add that the scramble was not only among
working-class families, or even mostly among them, but rather one

Mo. Pac. Ry. v. Baxter, 60 N.W. 1044, 1045, 1047 (Neb. 1894).
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Yost, 76 N.W. 901, 901-03 (Neb. 1898).
Omaha & Republican Valley Ry. v. Krayenbuhl, 67 N.W. 447, 448,449 (Neb. 1896).
Id. at 449.
In general, these statutes limited the broad defenses employers successfully used
to defend against tort liability. See C. ARTHUR WILLIAMS, JR. & PETER S. BARTH,
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

COMPENDIUM ON WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 13-14 (1973).
62. WILLIAMS & BARTH, supra note 61, at 16-19.

Interestingly, the workers'
compensation system still does not apply to injuries incurred by employees of interstate
railroads. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (2006).
63. See WITT, supra note 56, at 70.
64. Id.
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among politicians, judges, academics, other policymakers, and the
general public. Many alternatives were considered and many end points
were possible, including employer-liability statutes, cooperativeinsurance schemes, commercial insurance, and vigorous safety regulation.6 Workers' compensation may have prevailed almost by accident
(as Witt suggested),6 6 by the influence of developments overseas," or
by other means. It certainly was not preordained.
Workers' compensation as the ultimate endpoint in this policy
scramble is also not central to our purpose. Our purpose is to explore
how regulatory responses to worker injuries will fare in a globalized
environment. Will this type of regulation survive and evolve, maybe
even grow? Or will it wither and die, as predicted by the conventional
wisdom? What is it about regulation of this particular problem that
makes it likely to fall into one category or the other?68
The first step is to think about the nature of the problem. Different
workplace issues present different problems to be solved. The workers'
compensation "problem" is different than the leave-time "problem"
which, in turn, is different than the low-wages "problem."" Differences
in the nature of the problem are likely to have important consequences

65. To say that workers' compensation won the policy battle is to gloss over a great deal
of variety in workers' compensation systems. See WILLIAMS & BARTH, supra note 61. In
a very real sense, there was not one winner, but fifty (or more) distinct winners.
66. WITT, supra note 56, at 210-11.
67. RODGERS, supra note 15 (describing the influence of developments in Europe on
American social policy).
68. Workers' compensation is a good place to begin because it is obvious that a
regulatory response is necessary. Workers will get injured. Society will settle on a system
for dealing with those injuries, one way or another. Even a system that says workers can
never recover from employers is a system. In fact, as I will discuss below, such a system
is pretty close to the one faced by Lars Erickson in Nebraska in 1894.
Although this is obvious for the problem of injured workers, it is also generally true. If
we think of regulation broadly enough to include no response, there is a regulatory
response to all workplace problems. The key is not to try to define some point on the
continuum when very low regulation becomes no regulation but rather to determine what
fits within the category of a "workplace" problem. In the United States, most non-elderly
people receive their health insurance through an employer. So that problem tends to be
categorized in this country as a "workplace" problem. Yet, that is not true in most other
industrialized countries, and it may not be true forever in the United States. So the
"workplace" categorization is not without problems. However, it is not one of the problems
addressed by this Article, which only discusses issues that have a close connection with
work in every society, such as work injuries, leave time, child labor, and low wages. This
Article's consideration of these areas may have implications for the effect of globalization
on regulation in other areas, but it is focused on workplace regulation.
69. I will discuss these other problems later. See discussion infra Parts II.A.-B., 111.
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for the cost of labor regulation and for the fate of labor regulation in the
face of globalization.o
The basic problem with workplace injuries is determining how to
insure workers and society against the losses caused by such injuries.
Workplace injuries are inevitable, but they are more likely with some
employers and employees than others. One of the principal causes of the
push for workers' compensation in early-twentieth-century America was
the danger posed by the new industrial employers, especially the
railroads." In 1889, for example, approximately 2,000 railroad workers
were killed and approximately 20,000 were injured.72 With about
700,000 total railroad workers, this meant that in a single year
approximately 1 out of every 350 workers was killed and 1 out of every
35 was injured. 3 Among railroad employees, some were especially at
risk.7 4 For example, trainmen-engineers, firemen, conductors, and
brakemen-were even more likely to be maimed." One in every 117
was killed and 1 of every 12 was injured.76 (To provide a comparison,
in 2011, 1 out of every 28,571 American workers was killed in an occupational accident7 7 and 1 out of every 28 was injured enough to miss
work.)7 8 Thus, there was a need for some type of social insurance, but
it was unclear how workers and society could best protect themselves
against these kinds of losses. Again, every system of regulation, even a
no regulation system, will provide this protection in one way or another,
for better or worse.
Given this, consider two possible regulatory approaches to the problem
of workplace injuries. On one end of the continuum, one could imagine
a less-than-tort-system response: a Hobbesian world in which injured
workers simply had no recourse against employers. This world sounds

70. Id.
71. WILLIAMS & BARTH, supra note 61, at 14-16.
72. See WALTER LICHT, WORKING FOR THE RAILROAD: THE ORGANIZATION OF WORK IN
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 190-91 (1983).

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 190.
Id.
Id. at 191.
Id.
See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTIcs, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, FATAL WORK
INJURY RATES, BY AGE GROUP (2011), available at http://www.bls.gov/iif/oshwckfoi/cfch
0010.pdf.
78. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICs, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, WORKPLACE
INJURIES AND ILLNESSES-2011 (2012), Table 5, available at http://www.bls.gov/news.rele
ase/archives/osh_10252012.pdf. The injury statistics from then and now look more similar
than they actually are. Today, "a injury" likely means something serious enough to require
a day away from work or a reassignment; in the early twentieth century, many of the
things we would classify as "injuries" today would likely not have been recorded as such.
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odd to modern ears, but it is not unimaginable. In fact, it is pretty close
to early-twentieth-century America, when the "unholy trinity" of
contributory negligence, assumption of the risk, and the fellow-servant
rule blocked most lawsuits. This meant there was only a small window
of employer liability for large injuries, and because the costs of suing
were high, there was effectively no remedy at all for small injuries, even
when employers were clearly at fault and workers could avoid the
unholy trinity. Let's call this world "Hobbes."
First, consider the employers in Hobbes. At first glance, one might
think that employers get off scot-free, but that would be wrong. In
early-twentieth-century America, why would any worker take a job as
a switchman (coupling and uncoupling railroad cars), where the chances
of a disabling injury in any year was 1 in 7, when one could work for the
same railroad as an office or station employee, where the chances of such
an injury were only 1 in 167?"9 Or why would one work today selling
garden equipment instead of appliances when one is more than twice as
likely to be injured by garden equipment (go figure)?"0 The answer is
that a worker might work at the more dangerous job if the employer
paid more for that job. How much more would the employer have to pay
to get people to work as switchmen and garden-equipment sellers?
In a perfect world where the labor market is competitive, workers
have perfect knowledge about job risks, and people can move freely
between jobs, the extra wages would exactly compensate switchmen and
garden mavens for the extra risk they assume." The extra wages
would be enough to cover any lost wages, the pain and suffering from
the injuries, and all other costs, but they would only do so by the extra
probability that workers would be injured. The extra money that
employers would have to pay workers would, in turn, encourage
employers to think about work injuries. In our perfect world, if
employers could make work safer for switchmen and garden-equipment
sellers, they would be willing to spend money to do so if they saved at
least that amount of money on the wage premium. On the other hand,
if paying for the extra risk of injury was cheaper than making the safety
improvements, the employer would just pay the extra wages, again, in

79. LICiHT, supra note 72, at 195.

80. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, WORKPLACE INJURIES
AND ILLNESSES-2011 (2012), Table 5, supra note 78. Garden equipment sellers are injured
at an annual rate of 5.3 workers per 100 workers, while appliance sellers are injured at an
annual rate of 2.0 workers per 100 workers. Id. (I have cheated a little here: the "garden
equipment" category is actually sellers of "[bluilding material and garden equipment and
supplies" and the "appliance" category is actually "[ellectronics and appliance stores.") Id.
81. See Ronald G. Ehrenberg, Workers' Compensation, Wages, and the Risk of Injury,
in NEW PERSPECTIVES IN WORKERS' COMPENSATION 71-81 (John F. Burton, Jr. ed., 1988).

392

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

our perfect world. (Don't worry, we're going to get to the real world
pretty soon.)
So where does this leave injured workers in Hobbes? The problem for
workers is that they only receive increased wages for the extra risk they
will be injured, not for the full cost of injuries when they occur. So even
a worker who received a fair (or more than fair) wage premium for her
extra risk of injury would come out a big loser if she got injured on her
first day on the job. She would have received only a very small increase
in her total wages but would have suffered the full cost of an injury. On
the other hand, a worker who is lucky and never gets injured would
come out ahead; he would get the wage premium, but never suffer the
costs of an injury.
There is a solution to this problem-insurance. Insurance would
equalize the experience of our two workers; the injured worker would be
compensated, while the uninjured one would pay premiums. In a perfect
world (here we go again), the premiums would exactly equal the wage
premium for the dangerous work. In the early twentieth century, the
need for this type of insurance was met in a number of different ways.
Commercial insurance companies offered work-accident insurance;
unions and other worker groups established cooperative societies for this
purpose; and even some employers offered this type of insurance as an
employee benefit.82
Let's leave Hobbes for the moment and think about another regulatory
approach to the problem of workplace injuries: workers' compensation.
Compared to Hobbes, workers' compensation flips the liability question
on its head. Instead of never being liable, employers are always liable
for workplace injuries, even if the employer is not negligent at all, even
if the worker's negligence contributed to her injury, and even if the
worker is well aware that the work is dangerous." However, workers
do lose something: in exchange for the expansive protection, workers'
compensation provides a level of compensation that, by design, leaves
injured workers worse off than if no injury had ever occurred." The
primary limit on compensation is that no recovery is provided for pain

82. Wrrr, supra note 56, at 71-76, 113-17. In the case of employer-provided insurance,
presumably (following the reasoning in the text above) employers would provide such
insurance when the costs of insuring their employees against work-injury losses were lower
than the wage premiums they would have had to pay otherwise.
83. This is a good description of the core bargain of workers' compensation, but it leaves
out a lot of nuances; for example, issues often arise over whether an injury really occured
in the workplace or whether an employee's conduct was so far beyond contributory
negligence that she should not be covered.
84. Richard A. Epstein, The Historical Origins and Economic Structure of Workers'
CompensationLaw, 16 GA. L. REv. 775, 800 (1982).
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and suffering. In general, workers' compensation provides medical care,
rehabilitation costs, and something less than full wages, but that is
all.8 5 One thing this too-low level of benefits does is to provide rough
protection for the system; for example, workers wil not feign injuries
and will take adequate care to protect themselves from injury because
workers' compensation, while providing some protection, leaves them
worse off than if they continue working. 6 Let's call this system
"WC."a

In general terms, what does WC mean for employers and workers
compared to Hobbes? First, employers must now provide a basic level
of insurance against workplace injuries. This should reduce the wage
premium they need to pay because workers are no longer exposed to the
risk of uncompensated workplace injuries. WC should also encourage
employers to pay attention to workplace safety because they will have
to pay for injuries. At the least, employers should be willing to expend
money to improve safety to the extent it costs less than the workers'
compensation payments required for any injuries that would occur
without the safety improvements. At the same time, however, WC will
not reduce the wage premium to zero because, by design, the system
does not provide full coverage. Any of the expected costs resulting from
workplace injuries not covered by workers' compensation will still be
built into wages. As a result, today in the United States, even with
workers' compensation, there is a wage premium for dangerous work.'
Second, the turn to WC means that all workers now have at least
some insurance against workplace injuries. This will displace private
commercial insurance and worker cooperatives that might have arisen
otherwise. Unlike Hobbes, where workers might choose to go uninsured,
under WC all workers are required to be insured. Thus, no one will be
completely unprotected. However, workers' compensation does not
provide full coverage. For the uncovered portion of their risk, workers
are still in a Hobbesian world with all that entails, such as wage

85. In addition, there are caps on workers' compensation recoveries, so high-wage
employees are not fully covered even for their wage losses. See STEVEN L. WILLBORN ET
AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 876-79 (5th ed. 2012). Although this is the

general structure, workers' compensation is a state-level program, and there are significant
differences between the states in how these benefits are calculated and in their generosity.
See id. at 877.
86. Epstein, supra note 84, at 800.
87. Two points about this. First, I'm using "WC" to refer to the system of workers'
compensation, not to the payments themselves or any particular aspect of the system.
Second, we all have to agree to remember that this does not refer to water closets.
88. See Ehrenberg,supra note 81, at 78-81.
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premiums, differences in outcomes for injured and uninjured workers,
and the possibility of private insurance.
What might this example teach us about the race-to-the-bottom claim?
Although race-to-the-bottom proponents are often unclear about what the
"bottom" might be, Hobbes is a likely candidate for the problem of
workplace injuries. At the very least, it is closer to the bottom than WC.
In Hobbes, the government does not require employers to provide
insurance or, indeed, to do anything at all about the problem of
workplace injuries. By contrast, WC requires employers to provide
insurance against the risk of workplace injuries, requires them to pay for
it, and requires an administrative structure to administer the insurance
system. So should globalization cause a race from WC to Hobbes?
The first step is to examine the basic race-to-the-bottom syllogism: all
labor regulation is costly, globalization will eliminate costly regulation,
and therefore WC is doomed. There is no doubt that, on its face, WC is
more costly than Hobbes. Again, WC requires employers to provide and
pay for insurance and have an administrative structure; Hobbes requires
none of that. The flaw in the basic syllogism, however, is that it does
not examine costs broadly enough." Employers and society are not
only worried about the direct costs of WC. Instead, they are worried
about the overall costs of the system for dealing with workplace injuries.
Even if WC imposes more direct costs on employers, society and
employers may favor WC if it reduces the overall costs of the system.o
The question, then, is how do the two systems, Hobbes and WC,
compare on overall costs? The basic race-to-the-bottom syllogism
generally approaches an issue like this by beginning with a formal,
idealistic examination of the two systems-by assuming a world in which
markets are competitive, all the parties have perfect information,
transactions are costless, and there are no external costs. Viewed in this
way, the basic syllogism is quite ironic because it means there is no
difference between Hobbes and WC and no reason to favor one over the
other. Under Hobbes, employers will pay more for workers at higher
risk of injury but only if it is cheaper to pay the wage premium than to

89. This implies that the race-to-the-bottom claim is supported by salience bias. To the
extent regulatory costs, such as the costs of WC, have more salience than other costs, that
bias would place extra pressure on regulatory costs compared to other costs. See generally
Jacob Goldin, Sales Tax Not Included: Designing Commodity Taxes for Inattentive
Consumers, 122 YALE L.J. 258, 264-66 (2012); Deborah H. Schenk, Exploiting the Salience
Bias in Designing Taxes, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 253, 272-73 (2011).
90. In law-and-economics terms, the goal is to reduce the sum of accident costs and
prevention costs. In this context, accident costs include the harm suffered by workers and
any costs associated with the system for resolving disputes. Prevention costs are the
expenses of avoiding workplace injuries, such as safety equipment.
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make the workplace safer. Thus, employers will invest in safety until
the workplace is optimally safe (or, if you prefer, dangerous)." At the
same time, the wage premium will exactly match the workers' expected
costs from the injuries that will occur from the remaining workplace
risks. Additionally, workers will be able to buy insurance at exactly the
cost of the extra risk (that is, at exactly the cost of the wage premium
they receive) because the insurance market will work perfectly. Under
WC, the only difference is that the employer rather than the worker will
buy the insurance, but it will be at exactly the same cost, which will
produce exactly the same protection for workers and the same investments in workplace safety.12 Thus, beginning with the costs of the
system overall rather than with assumptions about the costs of
government regulation, the perfect-market analysis indicates that the
systems will produce exactly the same outcomes." Given this, globalization will have no effect on the choice between Hobbes and WC.
The real issue, however, is how do the overall costs of the two systems
compare in the real, not-so-perfect world? What happens when there are
transaction costs and other market flaws? This world, the real world, is
much more complicated and opaque than a pristine, perfect world.
Consider Hobbes first. The real problem here is on the insurance side.
An important factor that led to workers' compensation in the early
twentieth century was the failure of all the other insurance options.94
Commercial insurance excluded many of the most dangerous occupations, disclaimed coverage for many common situations resulting in
injury (such as "voluntary exposure to unnecessary danger" and failure
to use "due diligence for . .. personal safety"), and had great difficulty

91. That is, for every remaining danger in the workplace, it will be cheaper to pay
workers for their injuries than to make the workplace any safer.
92. A couple of additional points about this. First, one difference is that in Hobbes, but
not in WC, employees would be able to choose whether to buy the insurance or not. Still
that would not affect overall costs. It would only mean that the group of "self-insured"
workers would bear the costs of their injuries individually, rather than have the costs
covered collectively through insurance. How the costs are distributed between individual
workers and the insurance companies is irrelevant to overall costs. Second, this approach
assumes that transactions are costless, so the administrative costs of the WC system are
assumed away. However, so are the administrative costs of the insurance system. I will
discuss that later. See discussion infra Part II.A.
93. Adding to the irony is that this outcome is an application of the most famous
theorem in Chicago School economics, the Coase theorem, which holds that in the absence
of transaction costs, the efficient (most cost-effective) solution will be reached through
private bargaining regardless of the legal rule. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3
J.L. & EcoN. 1, 2 (1960).
94. Wrrr, supra note 56, at 75.
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On the last point, the most famous
policing fraudulent claims."
insurance executive from that time, Mark Twain, once quipped that his
company was especially important because "[n]o man can take out a
policy . . . and not get crippled before the year is out.""

Another

insurance possibility, worker-cooperative associations, began at that time
but suffered classic unraveling through adverse selection. When workers
in the safest jobs declined to join, premiums went up, which caused the
next level of workers to abandon the association, causing another uptick
in premiums and so on until the whole scheme unraveled."
The failure of the insurance options, of course, did not mean that the
costs disappeared. Workers were still getting injured, and the costs of
those injuries would still be covered in some way. The ultimate
distribution of the costs without insurance is especially murky, but
several of the possibilities point back to employers. Most directly,
workers might ask for a higher wage premium for dangerous work. If
they could not insure against the bad outcome, they would need higher
wages up front to make the job comparable to less dangerous ones. More
indirectly, when uninsured workers were injured, they might fall back
on public programs to pay for their medical care and to support
themselves and their families. These public programs, however, would
have to be paid for, and employers would undoubtedly be one group
helping to cover the costs. Costs would also be distributed to others-taxpayers other than employers, charitable groups, injured workers,
and their families. Even though it is impossible to say precisely how
much, there is no doubt that failure of the insurance markets for injured
workers meant that employers would have to pay something extra on top
of the normal wage premium for dangerous work.
One way to view WC is as a reaction to the failure of the private
insurance market. Indeed, if the only effect of WC was to correct the
single market flaw of the unraveling of the insurance market in Hobbes,
it was certain to be a better approach to the problem of injured workers.
By definition, moving from a flawed market (Hobbes) to a perfect one
(WC) is an improvement. But there were many market flaws in Hobbes,
not one, and WC may or may not have "solved" all those flaws. When
there are multiple flaws in a market, lessening one flaw will have an
uncertain effect. It may worsen the outcome, make it better, or leave

95.
96.
97.
and is

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted)
Id. (quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 71-102. Unraveling was also a problem with commercial insurance, of course,
one of the reasons they adopted the rules mentioned earlier in the paragraph.
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matters the same; it is impossible to know in theory." Instead, there
is no alternative to the murky, difficult business of examining the
relative costs of the two systems. Likewise, WC is just as murky on
costs as Hobbes: how much employers should be charged for the
insurance, how generous the benefits should be, what procedures should
be used to make sure injuries were really workplace injuries and to
determine the proper recovery, and so forth.
What does this mean for the basic race-to-the-bottom argument that
all labor regulation is costly, and therefore, at special risk by globalization that will squeeze out costly regulation? More particularly, what
does it mean for the claim that WC regulation is costly and will be
squeezed out in favor of Hobbes?
First, this discussion demonstrates that the claim that all labor
regulation is costly and therefore at risk is sometimes incoherent. For
example, society will have to address the issue of worker injuries. Even
Hobbes is a type of regulation designed to address this issue. Globalization will not and cannot make the issue disappear. Thus, the basic
claim is better formulated as a comparative one: globalization will put
pressure on labor regulation that is more costly compared to other
alternatives.9 9
Second, the comparative evaluation required by the race-to-the-bottom
argument is very complex and deeply empirical. This examination of
worker-injury regulation demonstrates that evaluation only of the direct
costs of regulation is insufficient. Pointing only to the direct costs of WC
such as insurance costs to employers, payments made to injured workers,
and the costs of the administrative structure is insufficient because
every system for dealing with worker injuries occurs within a broader
market for labor. Every "cost" of WC will create ripples elsewhere in the
system, for example, in the level of wages and in the types of investments employers make in safety, which will affect the number of
injuries. Only a comparison of the total effects of systems will be
sufficient to determine which is best and which will be favored by the
pressures of globalization.
Although this discussion has demonstrated the complexity of the
comparative evaluation, I have simplified it for expository purposes. I

98. This is one aspect of a well-known principle in economics known as the general
theory of second best. The seminal article in this area is R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster,
The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REV. EcON. STUD. 11 (1956).
99. See Colin Fenwick et al., Labour and Labour-Related Laws in Micro and Small
Enterprises:Innovative Regulatory Approaches 7-8 (International Labour Office-Geneva,
SEED Working Paper No. 81, 2007) (stating that "there is no simple dichotomy between
regulation and deregulation," but instead just various types of regulation).
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considered only two systems, rather than the multiplicity of possible
systems that might be constructed. For example, I did not consider a
tort system for dealing with workplace injuries, one requiring employers
to comply with government-mandated safety standards, various
combinations of the systems, or even detailed versions of either Hobbes
or WC.100 The complexity of the evaluation required by the race-tothe-bottom argument makes it unlikely that there will be a race or that
it will be towards a single bottom. Complex evaluations take time and
may well arrive at different conclusions about which system is best.o
Finally, this discussion has demonstrated that the claim by race-tothe-bottom proponents that little or no regulation will always be favored
by globalization is highly questionable. Regulation dealing with worker
injuries presents both empirical and theoretical reasons to doubt the
claim. Empirically, the available evidence supports the conclusion that
WC is the more efficient system and would be favored by globalization,
rather than doomed by it. The historical evidence supports this. In the
early twentieth century, the movement away from something like
Hobbes to WC was favored by both workers and employers. 102 This is
consistent with the claim that the WC system was more efficient; both
sides could come out ahead only if that was the case. It is inconsistent
with the claim that less regulation is always preferable. The contemporary evidence also supports the notion that WC is the preferable system.
WC is primarily based in state law, and the same dynamics the race-tothe-bottom proponents claim for globalization should be in operation as
states compete against one another. Thus, if Hobbes or something like
it was a better system for dealing with workplace injuries, states should
be under pressure to abolish WC. Yet WC is still the predominant way
of dealing with workplace injuries in every state. Again, this is
consistent with a claim that WC is a better system than Hobbes (and

100. Because the systems tend not to be exclusive, many combinations are possible.
In fact, our current system combines state WC systems with state and federal safety
standards. The number of possible combinations is very high.
101. This uncertainty provides advantages to federal states. See infra Part IV.C. In
such states, different subnational jurisdictions can experiment with different types of labor
regulation to hone in on the "best" one. Given this, one should expect less impact on labor
regulation in federal states (such as the United States and Germany) than in non-federal
states (such as the United Kingdom). See infra text at notes 186-88.
102. Ironically, employers supported the movement sooner than labor. Employers were
beginning to be burdened by tort liability and were worried about expanded liability with
the passage of employer-liability statutes, which eased tort standards for recovery. Unions
hoped that the employer-liability statutes would produce a more favorable system than WC
but eventually abandoned that belief and began to support WC. See WILLIAMS & BARTH,
supra note 61, at 13-18.
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other regulatory alternatives) for dealing with the problem of workplace
injuries. It is inconsistent with the race-to-the-bottom claim that little
or no regulation will always be favored. 03
More broadly, workplace injuries are an example of a type of
regulation that might survive, or maybe even thrive, in regulatory
competition: social insurance. The situation is one in which workers are
exposed to a risk that, if it occurred, would impose costs they would be
unable to cover out of their own resources. Thus, some sort of insurance
to spread risk across workers is required. A government program may
well be the best solution to this problem when it is designed to solve
flaws with alternative low- or no-regulation systems. In the case of
worker injuries, a no-regulation system would inevitably run into
standard insurance problems, such as unraveling, that a public program
may be able to avoid. A low-regulation system, such as tort law, would
also encounter problems that might be addressed by WC, such as
providing protection for smaller workplace injuries and holding down
transaction costs. Certainly, a WC system can be poorly designed and,
as a result, be inferior to other ways of dealing with workplace injuries.
If so, globalization would place it at special risk. It is also possible that
a WC system can be designed effectively to solve problems that cannot
be solved well with less regulation. In that case, globalization should
not threaten WC. Instead, it would make it more likely to survive and
grow.
We have used workplace injuries as our example in this part, but
other types of labor regulation also fall into this category. Unemployment compensation is another major area where labor regulation seems
to be preferable to private insurance. Private insurance against the risk
of unemployment is certainly possible, but maybe only as a theoretical
curiosity. It turns out that the adverse selection problems are just too
great for a real market to develop; workers who are willing to buy this
insurance know too much about their own personal risk of becoming
So we see virtually no private unemployment insurunemployed.'
ance. Instead, we see government plans everywhere. If globalization
increases the volatility of jobs, the risk of unemployment may go up as

103. The claim here is not that interjurisdictional competition has not put pressure on
state WC programs. Clearly, it has. See Emily A. Spieler & John F. Burton, Jr.,
Compensation for Disabled Workers: Workers' Compensation, in NEW APPROACHES TO
DISABILITY IN THE WORKPLACE 205, 220-24 (Terry Thomason et al. eds., 1998). Rather, the
claim is that such competition has not resulted in an abandonment of the workers'
compensation regulatory structure in favor of a low- or no-regulation approach.
104. See Ron Lieber, Good Luck Getting Private Insurancefor Unemployment, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 8, 2009, available at httpf//www.nytimes.com/2009/08/08/your-money/08
money.html.
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globalization increases. That would mean the demand for unemployment insurance should also go up. Because it can only be provided
effectively by the government, this may well mean that globalization will
result in more of this type of labor regulation.'a
Workers' compensation and unemployment insurance fit easily into
this category. Other classes of labor regulation may also fit, although
somewhat less well. Health insurance is one possibility, although the
United States is unusual in how it ties health insurance to employment.
If the ties between health insurance and employment are loosened, then
health insurance fits into this category less well (although, if that were
the case, it may be an example of non-labor regulation that might
survive globalization, but that is a topic for a different article).
Extending further, regulation of plant closings, mass layoffs, or even
discharges may fit into the category. Really stretching our wings, it may
be that even regulation designed to reduce wage disparities between lowand-high income workers could fit into the category. This type of
regulation would also reduce the impact of unemployment and other
The point here is not to explore the broader
types of job volatility.'
reach of the category but to claim that there is such a category, where
well-designed labor regulation is likely to survive and may even thrive
in the face of globalization.
Lars Erickson would have been surprised if he had heard years after
his accident that "we are all in favor of workmen's compensation."o
But that in fact happened in the following decades, and the discovery
was that government regulation could solve the serious social problem
presented by workplace injuries better than any of the other alternatives. The evidence from the states, which all use workers' compensation
to address the issue, is that we are still in favor of that system.
Globalization should not threaten that consensus and may even solidify
it.

105. See Jonas Agell, On the Benefits From Rigid Labour Markets: Norms, Market
Failures, and Social Insurance, 109 EcoN. J. F143, F155-F160 (1999) (arguing that
globalization may increase risks to workers and as a result, increase the demand for labor
market regulation).
106. A wider income distribution means that the harm from a period of unemployment
would be greater on average. Thus, narrower wage distributions would lessen the impact
of unemployment. See Linda A. Bell & Richard B. Freeman, The Incentive for Working
Hard:ExplainingHours Worked Differences in the U.S. & Germany, 8 J. LAB. EcON. 181
(2001).
107. See N.Y. State Bar Association, Proceedings,supra note 44.
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Leave Time: Individual Benefits
[Anthony Fioto was fired] from his job as sales manager at Manhattan
Woods Golf Club after he took a day off work to be present while his
dying mother underwent emergency brain surgery.'o
[Ilt is clear [because of adverse selection] that the market solution will
not provide universal insurance even though all individuals are willing
to pay more than it costs to insure themselves ....

[This suggests]

that it may be optimal for the government to intervene in the provision
of goods that some employers provide their workers.'o
Anthony Fioto did not have the right to take the day off to care for his
mother."o However, he was not alone. Audrey Seidle was fired when
she stayed home to care for her four-year-old son who had an ear
infection.'
Kimberly Troupe was fired when she was often tardy and
absent from work because of morning sickness during her pregnanDiane Piantanida was fired when she wanted to spend more
cy.1
time at home with her newborn child."' None of these people had any
legal right to take time off work for these reasons.
This would seem to support the basic race-to-the-bottom syllogism:
labor regulation requiring leave time is costly; jurisdictional competition
(in this case, mostly competition between states) will squeeze out costly
regulation; therefore, none of these people had any legal rights to leave
time. However, the story is much more complicated. First, there is a
federal law, the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA),"' which
provides unpaid leave for many situations, even though it was not broad

108. Fioto v. Manhattan Woods Golf Enters., LLC, 270 F. Supp. 2d 401,402 (S.D.N.Y.
2003).
109. Lawrence H. Summers, Some Simple Economics of Mandated Benefits, PAPERS &
PROC. OF THE HUNDRED AND FIRST ANN. MEETING OF THE AM. EcON. AsS'N (1989),

reprinted in 79 AM. EcON. REV. 177, 179 (1989) (footnote omitted).
110. Fioto, 270 F. Supp. 2d at 404-06. The court held that he had no right to leave
under the Family and Medical Leave Act but that the employer violated his employment
contract by firing him for his misconduct. Id. at 406-07.
111. Seidle v. Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co., 871 F. Supp. 238, 239 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
112. Troupe v. May Dep't Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 735, 739 (7th Cir. 1994). This case
also resulted in a famous quote by one of the most famous Chicago School academics
turned federal judge. In this case, Judge Richard A. Posner famously said that
"[e]mployers can treat pregnant women as badly as they treat similarly affected but
nonpregnant employees." Id. at 738.
113. Piantanida v. Wyman Ctr., Inc., 116 F.3d 340, 340 (8th Cir. 1997).
114. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2006 & Supp. V 2012).
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enough to help these people."' Second, at least twenty-two states and
dozens of localities provide greater rights to leave time than the
FMLA." 6 Some of those laws, had they applied, would have protected
these people. If the basic syllogism worked, all of these laws should
have been squeezed out through competition from other lower-regulation
states and localities. Third, at least seventeen of the top twenty
industrialized countries have laws providing for work flexibility."
Most of those laws would have protected these people. None of these
laws would exist if the basic syllogism applies.
The story about how this kind of regulation may survive is different
than the story about social insurance. For social insurance, the basic
story was one where insurance was required and subsidies across
workers were inevitable. Workers seriously injured the first day on the
job needed insurance for their losses; they needed subsidies from
somewhere else. Workers' compensation is a solution to that problem
that may be superior to other solutions. With leave time, however, the
benefit is very small in comparison to workplace injuries, unemployment,
or health insurance. For leave time, it is possible for every worker to
pay for her own leave time without any subsidies from anywhere else.
Let us begin the story with a world in which every worker wants leave
time to attend to sick mothers or newborn children. Providing a flexible
workplace costs employers something.. Employers will sometimes need
to scramble to find a replacement, may have to train the replacement,
and may have to pay overtime to a co-worker. Also assume that every
individual worker is willing to pay more than it costs the employer to
provide the leave time. Using standard economic reasoning, one would
expect to see every employer offer leave time in this circumstance. The
employer would offer the leave time and reduce wages by somewhere
between the cost to the employer and the value to the worker.
(Remember, we have assumed there is a gap there.) As a result, both
employer and worker would come out ahead. Would we see every
employer offer leave time? Would we see any employer offer leave time?
Even in this extreme circumstance where every employee is willing to
pay more than the costs of her leave, it is possible, probably even likely,
that no employer will offer leave time. First, suppose there are two

115. The FMLA covers only large employers and requires unpaid leaves only in certain
narrowly specified circumstances. Id. §§ 2611(4), 2612(a).
116. STEPHANIE BORNSTEIN & ROBERT J. RATHMELL, CENTER FOR WORKLIFE LAW, U.C.
HASTINGS COLLEGE OF LAW, CAREGIVERS AS A PROTECTED CLASS? THE GROWTH OF STATE
AND LOCAL LAWS PROHIBITING FAuIY RESPONSIBLITIES DISCRIMINAITON (2009).
117. ARIANE HEGEWISCH & JANET C. GORNICK, STATUTORY ROUTES TO WORKPLACE
FLEXIBILITY IN CROSS-NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 10 (2008).
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types of workers. Type X workers value leave time at $300, and it would
cost employers only $250 to provide it.n1 Type Y workers value leave
time at $100, and it would cost employers only $90 to provide it. In
addition, suppose no employer offers leave time, and these workers are
Will any employer begin to offer leave
each 50% of the labor force."
time? Consider an employer who offers leave time and reduces wages
by $95. The employer will attract both types of workers, but it will lose
on the deal. The average cost to the employer of providing the leave
would be (0.5 * $90) + (0.5 * $250) = $170. No employer will make that

deal-reducing wages by $95 to provide a benefit costing $170.
The other alternative is for the employer to offer leave time and
reduce wages between $250 and $300, let us say $275. The employer
will attract only Type X workers and, at first glance, would appear to
come out ahead on the deal; the employer would save $275 in wages
while providing a benefit that costs the employer only $250 on average.
However, there are two important reasons for thinking that no employer
would pursue this second option either. First, $300 is the average value
placed on leave by Type X workers and $250 is the average cost. Some
Type X workers, those who really think they will need the leave time
badly, will value it even more than $300, and they will probably be
right. These workers will seek out and apply for jobs with leave time as
a benefit. Because it will attract a particular subset of Type X workers,
the benefit will probably end up costing the employer a lot more than
the average cost of $250 and probably even more than the amount it
reduced wages, $275. This would again be a losing proposition.
Even apart from these financial calculations, there is another reason
an employer may be reluctant to offer a wage-leave-time package that
will attract only Type X workers. Suppose that Type X workers are
mostly women and Type Y workers are mostly men, which is probably
the case. (Did you get the hint?) If so, offering the package would result
in a segregated workforce because the employer would attract only
female workers. The employer may not want that either. So there we
are. Even if all workers value leave time more than it costs employers
to provide it, it is entirely possible, maybe even likely, that no employer
will offer it. Even in the best case, only half of the workers who want
leave time would be offered it-only Type X workers. This is a classic
first-mover problem.

118. This could be $300 and $250 per year, or $3.00 and $2.50 per hour. It does not
matter for our purposes; use whichever variation suits your tastes.
119. This example is a variation of one in an article by Lawrence Summers. See
Summers, supra note 109, at 179.
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Another problem in our hypothetical is that an employer may not
really know how much workers value leave time. Think of it from the
workers' perspective. An employer comes in and says, "Say, I'm thinking
of reducing your wages by $1,500, but I'll provide you with two weeks of
unrestricted leave each year in return. What do you say?" Assume you
(the employee) really value the benefit at $2,000. The best outcome for
you is to refuse to have your pay reduced but to still get the benefit.
Who knows? If you say no, enough of your co-workers may say "yes"
that you get the benefit anyway. This is a free-rider problem. Every
individual worker's goal is to position herself as a free rider-somebody
who gets the benefit without paying for it. If all workers position
themselves as free riders, the benefit is never offered. That certainly is
a possible outcome. Or maybe an individual worker would say that she
would think about the offer for a wage reduction of $1,000, but not
$1,500. Here, the goal is to signal that the worker really would like the
benefit, but getting it for less would be better. And it would be-except
that if every worker did this the benefit might never be offered at all,
even though all employees value it more highly than it costs the
employer to provide it. This is a strategic-bargaining problem. In both
the free-rider and strategic-bargaining situations, even though all
employees really prefer a package of leave time and lower wages to a
package of no leave time and higher wages, the employer never finds
that out. Each individual employee's best strategy is to hide her true
valuation. As a result, the preferred package is never offered. 1 20
Finally, it may be that workers really do value leave time more than
it costs the employer to provide it, but they just do not know it. This is
not as implausible as it sounds. Human beings, it turns out, are
systematically and predictably overly optimistic.121 Most people think
they are better than average drivers and will earn more than the
average earner over their lifetimes, even though this probably is not

120. Unions, of course, are a solution to this kind of problem. One of the theoretical
advantages of unions is that they provide a voice for workers collectively, which eases these
kinds of informational problems. See RICHARD R. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT Do
UNIONS Do? Ch. 6 (1984) (stating that one of the principal functions of unions is to provide
a mechanism for collective employee voice). However, unions are very rare in the United
States, especially in the private sector. BUREAU OF LABOR STATIsTIcs, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF LABOR, UNION MEMBERS-2012 (2013), availableat http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf
/union2.pdf (stating that in 2012, 6.6% of private-sector wage and salary workers and
11.3% of all wage and salary workers were members of unions).
121. See Sean Hannon Williams, Sticky Expectations: Responses to Persistent OverOptimism in Marriage,Employment Contracts,and Credit Card Use, 84 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 733, 742-45 (2009).
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true. 122 People tend to place an unduly low value on benefits that
might occur in the future. 123 For example, some people will choose to
receive $100 today over $110 tomorrow, even though that is a pretty
decent interest rate (roughly, an annual interest rate of 3,650%).'2
There is no dispute that people systematically deceive themselves in
these ways-this is one of the hottest areas of legal and psychological
work, and it has already earned one Nobel prize.'2 5 There are fancy
technical names for the biases (in our situation, the first is called
"optimism bias" and the second is called "hyperbolic discounting"), and
these findings have already made their way into the statute books. 2 6
In our situation, these types of biases may make people under-value
an offer of future leave time. First, when presented with an opportunity
for leave time to deal with a sick mother or a newborn child, workers
may think they really will not need it. They may be overly optimistic
about how well they can get along without such leave.12 Plus, the
lower wages will come right now and the leave will only come later.
Thus, when an employer makes an offer of leave time in return for lower
wages, workers may refuse it, even though they might be better off in
the long run if they accepted it.
Where does this get us? So far, we have determined that for a variety
of reasons the labor market may not provide leave time to workers even

122. See id. For examples of studies incorporating optimism bias into legal analysis,
see Ron Harris & Einat Albin, Bankruptcy Policy in Light of Manipulation in Credit
Advertising, 7 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 431 (2006) and Avishalom Tor, The Fable of Entry:
Bounded Rationality,Market Discipline, and Legal Policy, 101 MICH. L. REv. 482 (2002).
123. Shane Frederick et al., Time Discountingand Time Preference:A CriticalReview,
40 J. ECON. LITERATURE 351, 361 (2002).

124. Id. at 361.
125. See All Prizes in Economic Sciences, NOBELPRIZE.ORG, http://www.nobelprize.org/
nobel-prizes/economics/laureates.
Daniel Kahneman, one of the two people most
responsible for this area of research, won the Nobel Prize in economics in 2002. Id. (As
a latecomer, this prize is officially known as the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic
Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel).
126. See the Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780 (2006).
This Act drew on three central findings of the behavioral economics literature as part of
its restructuring of American pension policy. Jodi DiCenzo, Behavioral Finance and
Retirement PlanContributions:How ParticipantsBehave, and PrescriptiveSolutions (Emp.
Benefit Research Inst., Issue Brief No. 301, 2007). It provided for automatic enrollment
in pension plans (to help counter status quo bias), provided for automatic escalation of
pension contributions (to counter loss aversion and endowment effect biases), and
facilitated standard investment options (to counter decision paralysis and risk aversion).
Id.
127. See Lisa Belkin, The Opt-Out Revolution, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2013, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/11/magazine/the-opt-out-revolution.html (describing the
extent to which highly educated women are exiting the workforce upon childbirth).
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when we make the extreme assumptions that every worker prefers leave
time and would be willing to pay more for it in reduced wages than it
would cost employers to provide it. The conclusion would also hold true
under less severe assumptions where, say, just a strong majority of
workers rather than all workers favored leave time.128
This is precisely the kind of situation where labor regulation can play
an important role. Because of flaws in the labor market, workers are
not provided the package of leave time and wages that would make both
them and their employers better off. Labor regulation requiring
employers to provide leave time could solve all these flaws in the labor
market. Most directly, it would solve the first-mover problem. The crux
of that problem was that the first employer to offer leave time would,
through self-selection, attract a workforce that would skew the normal
financial calculations. If a law required all employers to begin offering
leave time at once, that self-selection problem would disappear.
Similarly, a law requiring leave time would avoid the free-rider and
strategic-bargaining problems. Those issues simply would not be
relevant anymore. Finally, a law would overcome the behavioral biases
problems that may otherwise stand in the way of making both employers
and workers better off. Workers may be surprised by how much they
need and like leave time after they receive it, but it would be a pleasant
surprise.
If this is true, then labor regulation requiring leave time, like workers'
compensation laws, may survive the pressures of globalization. The
basic reason is that the first step of the basic race-to-the-bottom
syllogism would not be met-this regulation would not impose costs.
Instead, it would leave both employers and workers better off than they
would be without the regulation.
We have some evidence that this is more than a theoretical curiosity.
As mentioned above, at least twenty-two states and dozens of localities
in the United States have laws requiring some type of leave time. 2 9
Internationally, the United States and most other countries have laws
requiring leave time, although with widely varying levels of generosity.3 o If the basic race-to-the-bottom syllogism were true, none of these
laws could survive. Competition between the states would eliminate the
state laws and competition between countries (that is, globalization)
would eliminate the national laws. It is possible that all these laws

128. Gillian Lester has made a similar set of arguments for the underproduction of
leave time in the private, unregulated labor market. Gillian Lester, A Defense of Paid
Family Leave, 28 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 1, 10-16 (2005).
129. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
130. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
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impose great costs on employers and workers but nevertheless exist
because of other flaws in the race-to-the-bottom argument. But it is also
possible that the laws survive because they provide real value to
employers and workers.
Leave time has been our example, but other types of labor regulation
may fit into the category. The situation here is one in which workers
may prefer a benefit and be able and willing to pay for it individually,
but nevertheless the benefit is not provided because of a variety of flaws
in the labor market. For example, protection against unjust discharge
could fit into this category. Workers may be willing to pay for this kind
of protection but may be very hesitant to ask employers to provide it
because of the signals it might send about what kind of employees they
might turn out to be. ("Would you please agree not to fire me if I turn
out to be a bad worker?") Similarly, employers might be reluctant to
offer this kind of protection for fear that they will attract a set of
workers who really, really need it. A law requiring protection from
discharge would solve both these problems. This kind of protection is
provided in most of the industrialized world outside of the United States,
and it has not been eliminated by globalization, which supports the
claim that it provides value."3 ' Privacy protections may also fit into
the category. Protecting privacy is a costly business, but workers may
well value it more than it costs. At the same time, protecting privacy is
an extremely complicated business, so the costs of negotiating protections at the individual or workplace level would be high. Government
rules may be able to provide expertise and economies of scale to make
the protections possible. Again, privacy protections in Europe and
elsewhere have survived globalization,"' which supports this claim.
With Lars Erickson, we were able to look back and observe a labor
regulation (workers' compensation) that seems to solve significant labormarket flaws. It replaced a legal structure with easily observable
problems, and it has been relatively stable for decades. We are not in
such a favorable position with Anthony Fioto. If laws guaranteeing
leave time solve the kinds of labor-market flaws described here, they
should become more common under the pressures of globalization.
However, the crystal ball is cloudy, even though there is no doubt that
there will be many more Anthony Fiotos out there with sick mothers.

131. Jeffrey M. Hirsch,A ComparativePerspectiveon Unjust DismissalLaws (Univ. of
N.C., Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2095336, 2012), available at http://papers.ssm.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractlid=2095336.
132. See Frank Hendrickx, Protection of Workers' Personal Data in the European Union
(July 2002), ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=2507&langld=en.
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Despite these uncertainties, there are three central messages flowing
from the discussion in this part. First, there are problems that the labor
market must address. The problem of workplace safety, for example,
will be addressed, and however addressed, the scheme will have some
balance of costs and benefits. A no-regulation alternative, which means
employers will bear no costs, simply does not exist. Second, net-value
labor regulation should fare well in the face of interjurisdictional
competition. The race-to-the-bottom claim is wrong to the extent it
claims all labor regulation will inevitably be hugely threatened by
globalization. If the labor market works the way race-to-the-bottom
proponents think it does, then labor regulation that provides net-value
should grow, not shrink, in the face of global competition. Third, it is
exceedingly difficult to determine the net costs and benefits across
different regulatory alternatives. This means that the race-to-the-bottom
claim, at bottom, tends to be more political than economic. Acceptance
or rejection of it, especially in the loose way it is used by labor-law
scholars, tends to be more a mirror of one's preexisting views than it is
a reflection of sober analysis of the real world.
III.

THE COST OF LABOR REGULATION

Labor regulation that imposes net costs on society is in a different
situation than net-value labor regulation. By definition, the benefits of
this type of labor regulation do not exceed its costs. As a result, a
jurisdiction that enacts net-cost labor regulation will be in roughly the
same position as one that fails to enact net-value labor regulation:
overall, it will be a poorer island. Under global competition, these effects
will be magnified, so there will be more pressure not to enact, or to
repeal, net-cost labor regulation.
The question here is whether this type of labor regulation would
conform to the race-to-the-bottom thesis. Would it be squeezed out by
global competition? As our example, consider a jurisdiction that enacts
a minimum-wage law to redistribute income to low-wage workers.
Because we want to focus on net-cost labor regulation, we will assume
that the costs of this regulation exceed its benefits."a' That is, the
benefits to low-income workers in increased income are less than the
costs of the regulation to employers (who are paying more than marginal

133. The evidence on this is mixed. See, e.g., CARD & KRUEGER, supra note 20; Shaviro,
supra note 20. But that is not important for our purposes. We are assuming that
minimum-wage regulation is net-cost regulation to explore the race-to-the-bottom argument
as applied to this type of regulation.
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productivity would justify), other workers (who may lose their jobs), and
consumers (who may pay for some of the increased wages).
Why would a jurisdiction enact labor regulation if it imposed net costs
on society? Considering these reasons helps us sort through the race-tothe-bottom argument. One possibility is that the jurisdiction is
attempting to reduce political uncertainty. In other areas, such as
securities regulation, it is widely accepted that regulation on disclosure
and protection of minority stockholders can improve capital markets by
increasing confidence and reducing uncertainty.'3 Similarly, it is well
accepted that a well-functioning court system, even though costly, can
improve international competitiveness."'s
Finally, there is good
evidence that policies that reduce income inequality foster political
stability, and markets value this stability.13' This response, of course,
is cheating a bit. In essence, it argues that because of the value of
political stability, even purportedly net-cost regulation is not really netcost."a' However, the claim does support two points. First, some
purportedly net-cost regulation may not be net-cost regulation if its
effects are fully accounted for. Second, it is very difficult to evaluate the
costs and benefits of labor regulation. However, not all purportedly netcost labor regulation necessarily fits into this category-some actually
imposes net costs.
Consider another rationale for minimum-wage legislation, assuming
this time that it truly is net cost. It may be that the law is enacted
because of a societal preference for less income inequality. The

134. See, e.g., Rafael La Porta et al., Legal DeterminantsofExternal Finance,52 J. FIN.
1131, 1139-46, 1149 (1997) (discussing the empirical analysis of debt and equity markets
in forty-nine countries and finding that strong legal protections for investors have a large
positive effect); Mark Yeandle, Long Finance,The GlobalFinancialCentresIndex 12, at 40
(2012), availableat http://www.zyen.com/PDF/GFCI%2012.pdf (showing that of the fourteen
factors used to assess the world's top financial centers, the regulatory environment and a
fair and just business environment are ranked as the second and sixth most important,
respectively).
135. See, e.g., AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999); CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
FREE MARKETS AND SocIAL JUSTICE 211-221 (1997).
136. See, e.g., Alesina & Perotti, supra note 25, at 1225-26 (providing empirical analysis
from seventy-one countries and concluding that income inequality increases social and
political instability which, in turn, reduces investment); Garrett, supra note 25, at 789, 798
(agreeing with Alesina and Perotti's view that reducing inequality increases social stability
leading to greater growth).
137. Note that I am not claiming that there is a time asymmetry causing a net benefit,
that is, a net cost now and a larger net benefit later because of political stability. The
claim is that the cost (extra wages) and benefits (extra stability) occur at the same time
(maybe conceptualized as a lowered probability of political instability at every moment in
time). I will consider time asymmetries later. See infra Part IV.A.
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possibility of a race to the bottom arises here, in essence, because of a
In
disjunction between political and economic decision-making.'a
broad outline, it is possible for a populace to enact a minimum-wage law
to satisfy its preference for less income inequality if one more than half
of the populace is in favor. Economic decision-making, on the other
hand, is much more individualized. On an island, employers who either
disagree with the law or whose business is adversely affected by the law
can take certain steps, such as reducing employment levels or investing
in other types of businesses, but they cannot escape. When there is
interjurisdictional competition, employers can go to other jurisdictions
that do not have such a law. The question is whether this dynamic will
put such pressure on net-cost labor regulations that they will disappear.
The task is to track the connection between these extra costs and the
decisions of particular employers who are prejudiced by the minimumwage requirement. The connection is long, complicated, and uncertain.
First, employers will need to determine the extent to which the
minimum-wage law is a net cost for them."as This is quite difficult for
a number of reasons. For example, efficiency-wage theory holds that the
increased wages will result in some increase in productivity; if that
occurs, the net cost will go down.""o Second, the increase will be a
signal to employers that a price increase for their product might be
possible. For example, all fast-food restaurants will know that their
labor costs are going up a bit, so all will know that a price bump is
possible. The demand curve for their product will, of course, impose a
limit on this increase, but any increase will lower the net cost for
employers who might think of exiting.' 4 ' The net cost of the mini-

138. See supranote 29 and accompanying text.
139. I am assuming that the law is net cost for some employers. The issue is the
magnitude of that net cost for individual employers.
140. For classic descriptions of efficiency-wage theory, see TRUMAN F. BEWLEY, WHY
WAGES DON'T FALL DURING ARECESSION 126-27 (1999); George A. Akerlof, Labor Contracts
as Partial Gift Exchange, 97 Q.J. EcON. 543 (1982); Carl Shapiro & Joseph E. Stiglitz,
Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker DisciplineDevice, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 433 (1984).
141. See CARD & KRUEGER, supra note 20 (The costs of an increase in the minimum
wage were partially offset by increases in product costs.). The ability of employers to offset
costs of labor standards could be enhanced if the regulatory scheme also included a labeling
requirement. The idea is that customers are willing to pay extra for the comfort of
knowing that the products they purchase have been produced under good labor conditions;
as a result, labeling would facilitate price increases directly related to the extra costs of
higher labor standards. See generallyRichard B. Freeman,A Hard-HeadedLook at Labour
Standards,in INTERNATIONAL LABOUR STANDARDS AND ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE 79,
80-84 (Werner Sengenberger & Duncan Campbell eds., 1994); ROBERT Z. LAWRENCE ET AL.,
EMERGING AGENDA FOR GLOBAL TRADE: HIGH STAKES FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 59-62
(1996).
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mum-wage increase may also be offset by changes in other parts of the
compensation package. If employers provide workers with any other
type of benefits (health care, pensions, leave time, extra breaks), these
could be cut back to recapture some of the increased costS. 14 2 Finally,
some employers do not employ low-income workers at all, so there would
be no net cost for them from the minimum wage. My point is not to
claim that the minimum-wage law does not impose net cost; to the
contrary, I am assuming here that it does. However, the employers'
reaction will depend not only on the existence of a net cost, but also, and
more importantly, on the magnitude and distribution of that increased
cost.14 3 Employers are positioned differently and have many options
for reacting to labor regulation to minimize the overall cost. As the net
cost gets lower, employers become less likely to race for the exits. The
race-to-the-bottom claim weakens.
Broader economic adjustments may also ameliorate the effects of netcost labor regulation. Two types of adjustments might be made to
account for extra labor costs. First, a jurisdiction might attempt to shift
costs from particular employers to the population more generally
through tax policies that offset the higher costs."
For a low-wage
policy, this might mean enacting a wage-subsidy program instead of a
minimum-wage law.' 45 For other types of labor regulation, tax policy

142. This is less likely to happen with minimum-wage laws than with most other types
of labor regulation. For something like mandated leave time, for example, employers can
make compensating adjustments in wage rates for all workers except minimum-wage
workers. For the minimum wage itself, workers are less likely to have other types of
benefits (such as health care or pensions) against which compensating adjustments can be
made.
143. For an analysis of the disparate effects of employment-protection legislation, see
Marco Leonardi & Giovanni Pica, Who Pays For It? The Heterogeneous Wage Effects of
Employment ProtectionLegislation, 123 ECON. J. 1236 (2013) (finding that an increase in
employment protections reduced wages, but the effects were quite heterogeneous with
greater wage losses for workers who changed jobs recently, younger workers, low-wage
workers, blue-collar workers, and workers in low-employment regions).
144. See John Douglas Wilson, CapitalMobility and EnvironmentalStandards:Is There
a Theoretical Basis for a Race to the Bottom?, in 1 FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION:
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 393, 394 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec eds., 2d ed. 1997)
(claiming that in theory, a race to the bottom cannot occur if there are no restraints on tax
instruments and "the economy is competitive and distortion free," but taxes can be set to
offset any increased societal costs exactly).
145.

DAVID T. ELLWOOD, POOR SUPPORT: POVERTY IN THE AMERICAN FAMILY (1988);

Shaviro, supra note 20. See also Anne L. Alstott, Work vs. Freedom: A Liberal Challenge
to Employment Subsidies, 108 YALE L.J. 967 (1999) (explaining that unconditional cash
grants to the poor would be superior to wage subsidies because they would be easier to
administer, it would be harder for employers to capture the benefits, and it would increase
freedom for the poor).
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could provide tax credits or other adjustments to employers to offset the
extra cost imposed by the labor regulation.'" These kinds of steps
would not transform net-cost labor regulation into net-benefit labor
regulation (we are still assuming that overall costs exceed overall
benefits), but it would affect the individual employer calculus, which
fuels the race-to-the-bottom claim.147 Second, and more broadly, in a
world with flexible exchange rates, an increase in labor costs for a
particular country may also lead to a depreciation of the country's
currency.14 s In theory, the argument would be that the increase in
labor costs will lead to an increase in the cost of the country's products,
which will reduce international demand for them, and thus produce a
downward adjustment in the nation's currency.14 9 As with tax adjustments, this would shift costs from particular employers to society more
broadly.1 0 It would not mean that the labor regulations would shift

146. See, e.g., Iowa Assistive Device Tax Credit Act, H.F. 2560, 78th Gen. Assemb., 2d
Sess. (Iowa 2000) (unenacted) (providing tax credit to small businesses for assistive devices
and workplace modifications). Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell have argued that tax
policy is likely more efficient than changes in legal rules (such as a change in the
minimum-wage law) in pursuing redistributionist goals. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell,
Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient Than the Income Tax in RedistributingIncome, 23
J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994). But see Richard S. Markovits, Why Kaplow and Shavell's
"Double-DistortionArgument"Articles are Wrong, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 511 (2005). For
an application of the general idea to an area of labor policy, see David A. Weisbach,
Toward a New Approach to Disability Law, 2009 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 47 (2009) (arguing that
tax policy would better pursue redistributionist goals of disability law for observable
disabilities, but not for non-observable ones).
147. I focus on the possibility that tax policy might be used to offset the costs of labor
regulation. The idea is that labor regulation can be designed in ways to attend to the cost
concern. See Fenwick et al., supra note 99, at 84-87 (identifying education, information
disclosure, and required procedures as other low-cost regulatory alternatives).
148. Even if the devaluation does not occur by normal market forces, a state could
decide to "pay" for higher labor standards through an intentional devaluation. See
Freeman, supra note 141, at 87 ("I do not accept the premise of some that bad standards
drive out good standards.... A country can pay for [labor] standards that increase its cost
of production ... through exchange-rate devaluation, with all consumers bearing the
burden. . . ."). See also MILTON FRIEDMAN, The Casefor Flexible ExchangeRates, in ESSAYS
IN POSITIVE EcoNOMIcs 157, 173-74 (1953) (arguing that changing the exchange rate is an
efficient way to deal with economic dislocations given that wage rates are quite inflexible
downward).
149. DAVID C. COLANDER, MACROECONOMICS 512 (8th ed. 2010) (explaining that flexible
exchange rates permit greater freedom with monetary and fiscal policy). But cf RONALD
G. EHRENBERG, LABOR MARKETS & INTEGRATING NATIONAL ECONOMIES 10-12 (1994)
(flexible exchange rates may reduce the loss of exports from net-cost labor regulation but

may increase the price of imports).
150.

See supra note 149.
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from being a net cost to a net benefit, but it would soften the impact on
particular employers and ease race-to-the-bottom pressures.
On this last point, we have recently seen a dramatic case study of the
difference between using labor policy and monetary policy to respond to
international economic pressure. In Europe, an important part of the
austerity measures to deal with the recent economic crisis has been to
drive down labor costs both directly (through reducing public-sector
wages and employment) and indirectly (by reducing private labor
regulation, part of the so-called "structural" adjustments)."' In
Iceland, in contrast, currency devaluation was used as a principal
mechanism to address a similar crisis and to regain the country's footing
in international trade.'52 The currency devaluation, in effect, decreased wages and benefits for Iceland's workers, but it tended to work
more smoothly and quickly to address the crisis, and much less
controversially.'
Currency devaluation, of course, was not an available option in the stressed parts of the European Union." The point
is not to debate the relative merits of currency devaluation versus labor
adjustments as a response to international competitiveness concerns.
The point here is that labor and currency adjustments are partial
substitutes for each other. If labor costs increase too much, a country
can respond by paring back net-cost labor regulation, which is the
approach viewed as inevitable and necessary by the race-to-the-bottom
claim. However, theory and recent experience indicate that monetary
adjustments are another possible way to respond to net-cost labor

151. Joanna Pagones, Note, The European Union's Response to the Sovereign Debt
Crisis:Its Effect on Labor Relations in Greece, 36 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1517, 1535-36 (2013).
This dynamic is not a part of the normal race-to-the-bottom narrative. As discussed
earlier, the race-to-the-bottom claim applies when states are independent and engaged in
trade with each other. See supra text accompanying notes 14-15. The pressure on labor
regulation in Europe, in contrast, is largely a product of the interdependence of states
created by treaty that limits the ability of individual states to respond in ways other than
downward pressure on labor costs and regulation, such as through monetary policy. See
Jon Michaels, Deforming Welfare: How the Dominant Narratives of Devolution and
PrivatizationSubverted Federal Welfare Reform, 34 SETON HALL L. REv. 573, 606 n.97
(2002).
152. Charles Forelle, In European Crisis, Iceland Emerges as an Island of Recovery,
WALL ST. J., May 21, 2012, at Al, A10, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1O00
1424052702304203604577396171007652042.html; Sarah Lyall, A Bruised Iceland Heals
Amid Europe's Malaise, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com
/2012/07/08/world/europe/icelands-economy-is-mending-amid-europes-malaise.html?ref=
business&pagewanted=all.
153. See supra note 152.
154. See Michaels, supra note 151, at 606 n.97.
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regulation. To the extent that this alternative is used, the claim that
there will be a race to very lax labor regulation is weakened.
Even after all these individual employer and market factors which
might ameliorate the extra burdens of net-cost labor regulation, we are
still assuming that there are net costs remaining. The underlying
conditions feeding the race are smaller and less certain than claimed by
race-to-the-bottom proponents, but is it still not possible that the race
will occur? There are two additional impediments to a rapid employer
race to the exits. First, some jobs simply cannot be moved. Fast-food
servers and hair stylists, for example, cannot be outsourced to another
country.' 5 Some goods cannot be imported from other countries.' 56
As a result, any race is likely to occur in some sectors but not in others.
Second, every effort to outsource involves costs-the costs to establish a
new business, hire a new workforce, and export and import the
goods."' The net cost of the minimum-wage regulation must exceed
the net cost of these outsourcing expenses in order to justify a move. For
many employers, even those who suffer net costs from the labor
regulation, the sign of the equation will not be in a direction justifying

a move.

158

Even then, some employers may decide to exit because of the net cost
of the minimum-wage regulation. With respect to the race-to-the-bottom
claim, how should we think about this type of regulation-induced
movement of employers (or work) between jurisdictions? This part of the
race-to-the-bottom claim, in essence, asserts implicitly that this type of

155. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
156. See, e.g., Roger P. Alford, The Self-Judging WTO Security Exception, 2011 UTAH
L. REV. 697 (2011) (discussing import restrictions based on national security concerns);
Matthew Hunter Hurlock, Note, The GATT, U.S. Law and the Environment: A Proposal
to Amend the GATT in Light of the Tuna IDolphinDecision, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 2098(1992)
(discussing import restrictions based on environmental concerns).
157. Reputational and institutional factors may also discourage movement. See
JAGDISH BHAGWATI, IN DEFENSE OF GLOBALIZATION 130-31 (2004).
158. This analysis should not focus only on the minimum-wage regulation, but rather,
it should combine the extra cost of all net-cost labor regulation. Necessarily, the equation's
sign is more likely to point in the direction of an exit decision if all net-cost labor
regulations are included (unless the gains from net-benefit labor regulation are also
included in the analysis). However, this combinatorial problem re-emphasizes how
complicated the location decision is for employers. They are reacting not to the costs of one
labor regulation enacted at a discrete point in time, but rather, they are trying to estimate
the costs of all labor regulation (current and future) over an extended period of time. This
highlights the importance of the stories surrounding the race-to-the-bottom claim. These
exit and no-exit decisions and the rhetoric surrounding the net-cost-of-labor regulation are
more likely to be gestalt than fine accounting; the story accompanying the decision is likely
to be very important.
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movement will produce a convergence between countries in their
minimum wages. If a country is losing employers because of a net-cost
minimum wage, there will be downward pressure on the minimum-wage
level. On the other hand, a country receiving low-wage work may see
room to increase its minimum wage (and, hence, achieve more political
stability or income equality) without sacrificing its labor attractiveness
relative to other higher minimum-wage countries. Also, the wages of
low-wage workers may increase from simple economic pressure. This
begs the question of whether labor regulation(as opposed to wage levels
themselves) in different countries really will converge, or whether there
is more reason to think that it may remain quite different from country
to country. If countries do not converge, the race-to-the-bottom
argument is weakened.
The rationale and evidence for convergence of labor regulation is
weak."' Convergence would be likely to occur if countries were
similarly situated in their need and preferences for labor regulation. On
the minimum wage, for example, countries may differ on the proportion
of their populations employed in this segment of the labor market, in the
schooling and training opportunities available to channel people to
higher paying jobs, in the population's preferences for income equality,
and in the level of segregation between high- and low-income workers.

159. For empirical analyses, see, e.g., John Armour et al., How Do Legal Rules Evolve?
Evidence from a Cross-Country Comparison of Shareholder, Creditor, and Worker
Protection, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 579 (2009) (studying five countries and finding little

evidence of convergence in worker protection laws); Gahan et al., supra note 3, at 733-34
(studying the labor laws in six countries and finding little evidence of convergence
generally or of one leading to a race to the bottom). The rationale for a race-to-the-bottom
convergence relies, ironically, on an economic-determinism rationale-technical and market
forces will force convergence. For the classic articulation of this view, see CLARK KERR ET
AL., INDUSTRIALISM AND INDUSTRIAL MAN: THE PROBLEMS OF LABOR AND MANAGEMENT IN

EcoNoMIC GROWTH (1960). For a more recent articulation, see Thomas C. Kohler,
Comparative Labor Law: Some Reflections on the Way Ahead, 25 COMP. LAB. L & POL'Y J.
87 (2003). Critics of this rationale focus on institutional impediments to economic
determinism. See, e.g., OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE
INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE (Peter A. Hall & David Soskice
eds., 2001) (claiming that legal systems develop modes of regulation that are resistant to
change); Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, Legal Origins, 117 Q.J. ECON. 1193 (2002)
(arguing that original decisions about basic legal structure have a strong influence on
current legal systems); Katharina Pistor, Legal Ground Rules in Coordinatedand Liberal
Market Economies, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CONTEXT: CORPORATIONS, STATES AND
MARKETS IN EUROPE, JAPAN, AND THE US (Klaus J. Hopt et al. eds., 2005) (stating that

different countries have distinct social preferences that are embedded in their basic legal
ground rules and are resistant to change). For a more theoretical critique of convergence,
see Assaf Razin & Efraim Sadka, Fiscaland MigrationCompetition (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 16224, July 2010).
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A relatively high minimum wage may be desirable in some countries and
not in others, even if there is a net cost in both. Different needs and
preferences between countries may lead to a quasi-Tiebout effect in
which countries provide a package of labor regulations specially fitted to
a particular kind of society and labor market.'
Some countries may
attempt to develop a high-education, high-wage equilibrium, which
requires investments in education and innovation and that discourages
low-wage work, while others may be at a different stage of development
where low-wage work is the best option available.' 6 ' Even if low-wage
employers do begin to exit to a country with more accommodating labor
regulation for that type of work, this may not cause high minimum-wage
countries to change their labor regulation. The labor regulation of each
country may be calibrated for that country's particular circumstances;
more specifically, it may be calibrated to enhance that particular
country's comparative advantage.'6 2 This implies that companies
might well move to countries that attend best to their particular
business model, but it does not imply that other countries would respond
by attempting to match that regulatory model. Given different circumstances, they may be developing a set of labor regulations that attends
to quite different sets of goals and preferences.
The central message of this part is that, even for net-cost labor
regulation, there is a long, uncertain path from those net costs to a race
to the bottom. The regulations may be buying something that the
society values more than the net cost of the labor regulation (such as
political stability in our minimum-wage example); employers have many
ways of offsetting the net costs of labor regulation so their burdens are
likely to be much less than the raw net cost of the labor regulation;
economies have ways of adjusting to the increased costs through fiscal
or monetary policy; and, finally, it may be that a particular society's
labor regulations are attending to a particular type of comparative
advantage.

160. See supra note 31.
161. Dani Rodrik has argued that coordination problems can cause poor countries to
get stuck in this low-wage equilibrium even in circumstances where they have the human
capital to move to a different and better equilibrium. Dani Rodrik, CoordinationFailures
and Government Policy: A Model with Applications to EastAsia and EasternEurope, 40 J.
IN'L ECON. 1 (1996). Interestingly, the solution is more governmental involvement, not
less.
162. See supra note 32.
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IV. THE VALUE AND COST OF LABOR REGULATION:
(EVEN MORE) COMPLICATIONS

A. Time-Frame Issues
"I don't think I'll be able to return to school until the strawberries are
in," Alfredo says, not stopping to look up. "Maybe then, in a month or
so." In truth, he hasn't been in school for eight months. Likely, he will
never go back. His parents, Jesus and Clementina, are in their late
[fifties] and say they need him to work. "We are too old to work alone,"
Diaz says, watching his son. "We cannot make the money we need to
live if we do not have help."1es
Child-labor regulation is a good example of difficult time-frame issues
presented by the race-to-the-bottom claim. The Diaz family provides a
good illustration of the basic dilemma. Alfredo would be better off going
to school. In the long run, he would make more money and have a
better life. 164 But right now, Jesus and Clementina, his parents, need
him to work: "We are too old to work alone[. . .1. We cannot make the
money we need to live if we do not have help." 65
Societies are in a similar position, and the calculus for societies is no
easier than it was for Jesus and Clementina. If a society permits
children to work, it reaps the rewards of their labor (even at low wages)
and saves the costs of schooling. On the other hand, it may sacrifice the
longer-term benefits that might come from a better-educated populace.
Given this calculus, it is easy to see why some societies might be more
willing to permit child labor. If the society does not have the resources
to provide educational opportunities, there may be no long-term payoff.
If the society is desperately poor, it may not have the luxury of deferring
a payoff for a decade or more. This is, of course, a very familiar

163. Bruce D. Butterfield, The Tragedy of Child Labor, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 22, 1990.
164. Studies uniformly demonstrate a healthy payoff from increased levels of education.
See CLAUDIA GOLDIN & LAWRENCE F. KATZ, THE RACE BETWEEN EDUCATION AND
TECHNOLOGY (2008) (providing a good, long-term analysis of the education payoff).
165. Butterfield, supra note 163. This dynamic within families may result in "too
much" child labor if parents are not sufficiently attentive to the long-term economic
prospects of their children. See Antoine Bommier & Pierre Dubois, Comment, Rotten
Parentsand Child Labor, 112 J. POL. ECON. 240 (2004).
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In essence, the society is deciding whether a current
calculus."
investment will produce enough revenue in the future to be worth it. 67
But the question for us is what effect will interjurisdictional competition have on the calculus. Consider first the pressures within a country
that might lead to a policy permitting or prohibiting child labor. (Later,
we will consider how interjurisdictional competition might affect that
policy.) First, an important factor will be how important the child's
labor is to household income. If Jesus, Clementina, and Alfredo simply
cannot live on Jesus and Clementina's earnings alone, then something
must be done, and having Alfredo work is better than many of the other
options (starving, abandoning Alfredo, selling him into slavery, and so
forth). If this is the situation, the society is likely to permit child labor,
if not encourage it.
Another factor, related to the first, is the ability to invest in the child's
future. If a society cannot provide good training as an alternative to
work, and, as a result, children are pushed into even less desirable
activities than working, then prohibiting child labor may lead to worse
outcomes than permitting it. On the other hand, if good schooling can
be provided as an alternative to working, then the long-term calculus
may work: the increases in each child's future productivity will more
than pay for the lost earnings and the cost of schooling. This can only
occur if a society is sufficiently wealthy to provide the schooling.'6 8

166. Child labor presents a subset of the training issue where generally workers
(societies) decide whether to invest in current training in return for higher future returns.
See generally PAUL G. CHAPMAN, THE ECONOMICS OF TRAINING (1993). Child labor,
however, poses the question most pointedly for several reasons, including: (1) the moral
overlay, (2) the need for social investment in schooling given the general inability of
children to fund their own training, and (3) the special and long-term opportunity for
training given the long payback period and the low opportunity costs for the training time.
See id. at 114; Yoram Ben-Porath, The Productionof Human Capitaland the Life Cycle of
Earnings,75 J. POL. ECON. 352 (1967).
167. The child-labor calculus is, of course, much more complex than presented here.
For a broader discussion of the relevant considerations, see Christiaan Grootaert & Ravi
Kanbur, Child Labour:An Economic Perspective, 134 INT'L LAB. REV. 187 (1995); James
G. Scoville, Segmentation in the Market for Child Labor: The Economics of Child Labor
Revisited, 61 AM. J. ECON. & Soc. 713 (2002).
168. Both of these factors relate to societal wealth, and the empirical evidence supports
the claim that this factor is the single most important determinant of a society's child-labor
policy. See Kaushik Basu & Zafiris Tzannatos, The Global Child Labor Problem: What Do
We Know and What Can We Do?, 17 WORLD BANK ECON. REv. 147 (2003) (explaining that
child labor is mainly a function of poverty); Drusilla K. Brown, A TransactionCost Politics
Analysis of InternationalChild Labor Standards,in SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF U.S. TRADE
POLICIES 246-64 (Alan V. Deardorff & Robert M. Stern eds., 2000) (stating that the most
effective strategy for reducing child labor is to increase economic growth); Avinash K. Dixit,
Comment, in SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF U.S. TRADE POLICIES, supra, at 267-70 (stating that
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Countries might have different policies on child labor. One country,
let's call it "Disney," might prohibit child labor because it thinks its
investment will pay off; it will defer income from child labor, invest in
education, and count on higher returns later. On the other hand,
another country, "Copperfield," might decide that it cannot wait; it may
need the income now rather than later, or maybe it cannot afford to
provide the kind of schooling that would nurture the kinds of skills that
would permit a bigger payoff later.
Assume both Disney and Copperfield enter global competition. First,
what effect will this have on Disney's no-child-labor policy? When it
initially established its policy, Disney's calculation was that it could
afford to defer income and invest in education in exchange for higher
expected returns later. The cost and quality of education will not change
because of this new competition. The returns to education may increase
as more markets open up for those skills. At the same time, the new
competition may reduce the costs of the policy for two different reasons:
(1) with competition, wages for the foregone work would probably be
lower, so there would be less lost income, and (2) the goods and services
produced by this type of low-income labor is likely to be lower in cost
than before the global competition. On balance, global competition
would seem to reaffirm the earlier decision to prohibit child labor. The
returns to education in the future may be higher, the amount of current
income lost will be lower, and the cost of obtaining the goods and
services produced by this type of low-income labor will also be lower.
None of these factors undermine the prior decision; all cut in favor of
continuing the prior no-child-labor policy.
What about Copperfield's policy permitting child labor? The same
calculus that reinforces Disney's pre-competition policy decision to
prohibit child labor tends to weaken Copperfield's prior decision to
permit it: future returns from more education may be higher, current
income from child labor may be lower, and replacing the products of
child labor may be cheaper. This may not be enough to tip the balance,
of course: Copperfield may still decide that, for it, permitting child labor
is the better course. For Disney and Copperfield, the effect of competi-

reductions in child labor in the United States occurred when real GDP per capita reached
about $7,000 per annum in current dollars); Eric Edmonds & Nina Pavenik, Does
Globalization Increase Child Labor? Evidence from Vietnam (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 8760, 2002) (describing the decline in child labor in Vietnam
that followed an increase in farm income).
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tion provides some additional weight to the side of the scale in favor of
prohibiting child labor.'
The structure of the argument here is that a society will benefit by
having child-labor laws, but only over a fairly long time horizon. The
society will need to make an investment in Time 1 by having children
attend school rather than working (which imposes two distinct costs: the
costs of school plus the foregone benefits of current work) but will gain
even more in Time 2 when those children are more productive workers
because of the prior investment. Some societies will clearly not make
this choice for a variety of reasons (the time horizon is too short, for
example, or the society is not able to afford schooling that will produce
benefits in Time 2). The argument, however, is not directly about that
choice but rather about how increased global competition will affect it.
For both countries that choose to have child-labor prohibitions in Time
1 (Disney), and those that do not (Copperfield), the increased competition
tends to push in the direction of more child-labor protections, not
fewer.x1o

Time-frame issues complicate the analysis required to determine if a
particular labor regulation is net benefit or net cost. Apart from that,
it does not seem to cut uniformly or strongly in one direction or the other
on the race-to-the-bottom claim. 17 '

169. Consistent with this, Robert C. Shelburne finds that openness to international
trade is a significant factor in reducing the incidence of child labor. Robert C. Shelburne,
An Explanationof the InternationalVariationin the Prevalenceof ChildLabour, 24 WORLD
EcON. 359 (2001). Because of the beneficial effects of international trade, he argues that
policies that attempt to limit trade in targeted industries using child labor may be
counterproductive. Id. at 374. Such trade restrictions may reduce child labor in the
targeted industries, but they may not be as helpful overall as greater integration into the
global economy. Id.
170. Alan Hyde's interesting paper in favor of transnational labor standards seems to
recognize this. He explicitly disclaims a race to the bottom in his child labor example and
bases his argument instead on attempts to gain "short-term advantage." Hyde, supranote
4, at 11.
171. The downward rigidity of wages presents similar time-frame issues and provides
one answer to why employers might resist net-benefit labor regulations. Why, for example,
would employers resist a leave-time requirement if employees value the leave time more
than it costs employers so that, with the requirement, employers should be able to reduce
wages enough to cover at least all of the costs of the leave-time requirement, and maybe
more? One reason may be that wages are downwardly rigid, so employers will not be able
to immediately reduce wages to account for the extra costs of leave time. See supranote
37; see also supra discussion Part I.B. As noted by Hyde, supra note 4, employers may
suffer a short-term increase in total compensation until the increased costs and reduced
wages can be incorporated into the wage system. With respect to increased global
competition, an interesting question is whether this downward wage rigidity will harm
employers through higher short-term costs or whether it will ease the problem of
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Different Firms, Different Effects

Firms employ different kinds of workers, have different levels of
capital investment, and are more or less mobile. These differences mean
that labor regulation will inevitably affect different firms differently.
Thus, the costs and benefits of labor regulation will be far from uniform.
Some firms will benefit more than others; some will bear more of the
costs.
To illustrate, imagine a regulation that is precisely balanced in the
sense that each worker values the benefit it provides at exactly its cost
to the employer. For example, consider a regulation that requires an
employer to provide a certain amount of leave time (solving the
collective-action problems discussed earlier),172 and assume that each
worker values the leave time at exactly its cost to the employer. Under
this unlikely scenario, every employer is in exactly the same position.
If the law were changed to increase the number of leave days required,
the wages would adjust downward to exactly counter-balance the change
so there would be no change in overall compensation or in employment
levels.'
But now assume that workers are heterogeneous as they inevitably are
in the real world. To continue with our stylized example, assume that
female workers value the benefit more than it costs the employer to
provide it, while male workers value it less."' One consequence of this
is that assessment of the overall social benefit becomes much more

downward wage rigidity.
172. See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
173. This assumes a perfectly functioning market. Richard Craswell makes an
interesting, counterintuitive point from this type of analysis. Richard Craswell, Passingon
the Costs ofLegal Rules: Efficiency and Distributionin Buyer-SellerRelationships,43 STAN.
L. REV. 361 (1991). Intuitively, we tend to think that workers benefit more as it becomes
harder for employers to pass on the costs of labor regulation. Id. The intuition is that
workers will benefit from the regulation but not have to pay for much of it. Id. However,
the converse is more likely to be true-workers benefit more as employers are more able
to pass on costs-because the ability to pass on costs itself is one measure of the extent to
which workers value the benefits provided by the labor regulation. Id.
174. It is very difficult to determine the value workers place on leave time. This is a
reasonable assumption based on the use of unpaid family leave; in the most recent survey
of FMLA leave-takers, women took 58.1% of all FMLA leaves even though they constituted
only about 47% of the civilian workforce. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, FMLA SURvEYs: BALANCING

THE NEEDS OF FAMILIES & EMPLOYERS § 2.1.3 (2000), availableat http:Jwww.dol.gov/whd/
fmla/chapter2.pdf; U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, WOMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE: A DATABOOK 23-24
(2004), availableat http-//www.bls.gov/cps/wlf-databook.pdf; see also Lester, supra note 128.
This is merely an assumption. The general point is that this dynamic may occur whenever
there are identifiable demographic groups that value a benefit differently.
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complicated or, perhaps, impossible. To assess overall social value, the
net benefits must be weighed across the two different groups of workers.
Doing so raises difficult (some would say impossible) interpersonalvaluation problems. 7s However, the main issue is the ways in which
this will cause different employers to experience the regulation
differently.
Consider three possible employers. First, an employer with an allfemale workforce will experience a net benefit from the leave requirement. Since all employees value the benefit more than it costs the
employer to provide it, there is a surplus to be divided somehow between
employer and workers. This employer would have had such a requirement even without a government regulation except for the collectiveaction problem.' 76 If all employers were of this type, the leave-time
regulation would produce an unalloyed net value, and there would be no
race-to-the-bottom worries.
Second, an employer with an all-male workforce will experience a net
loss from the leave requirement. The male workers will have their
legally required leave time, but they will value it less than it will cost
the employer to provide it. When possible, the employer may reduce the
losses from the regulation by reducing wages to help pay for the costs of
providing the leave or taking other steps.'77 For some workers,
however, such as minimum-wage workers, it may not be possible to
reduce wages. In those cases, there will be a net increase in the
employer's costs.
Thus, even though the leave-time requirement may have an overall
net value, there may be a class of employers who fall on the wrong side
of a distributional divide. This class of employers may be attracted to
another jurisdiction that does not require this benefit and, as a result,
permits them to offer a compensation package that is more closely
tailored to the preferences of their workers. Under our assumptions, this
is not because the leave-time regulation does not provide overall net
value. It may do that, and we are assuming that it does. Rather, this
is because of the mix of workers these employers have, which places
them on the wrong side of the distributional divide. In this example,
these distributional consequences raise the possibility of competition
from lower regulation states or countries and, therefore, the possibility
of race-to-the-bottom pressures.

175. For a good description of the debates over interpersonal valuation, see Herbert
Hovenkamp, Coase, Institutionalism,and the Origins of Law and Economics, 86 IND. L.J.
499, 508-15 (2011).
176. See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
177. Id.
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Finally, most employers will fall between these extremes and have
some mix of male and female workers, and this will produce a spectrum
of distributional consequences for the employers between the two
extremes. In this circumstance, under our crude assumption that all
women value the benefit more than all men, these employers would be
tempted to reduce female wages more than male wages. That would
tend to keep the total compensation packages equivalent since the
women will value the leave time more than the men. However, this is
not an option because it would run afoul of anti-discrimination laws."
As a result, again, there would be a range of distributional consequences
that, very generally, would produce greater net value as an employer's
workforce tilted female and greater net costs as it tilted male."'
The real distributional consequences will, of course, be more complicated. Not all women (or men) will value leave time equally, so uneven
distributional consequences will occur even within all-female (or male)
workforces. Similarly, the costs to employers of providing leave time are
not likely to be the same for all employers. Economies of scale may
mean that large employers are able to comply with the regulation more
cheaply than small employers, or employers of professional workers may
be able to accommodate leave requests more cheaply than employers of
blue-collar workers. 80
So where does this get us on the race-to-the-bottom argument? This
kind of distributional argument is regularly used to respond to the claim
that some labor regulation can produce overall net value and, as a

178. Both Title VII and the Equal Pay Act prohibit sex-based wage discrimination.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e17 (2012); Equal Pay Act,
29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2012). However, even this is complicated. Some workforces may be
segregated by sex. If that is the case, an employer could adjust wages to account for the
different preferences. As an extreme example, if an employer had all male employees in
job category A and all female employees in a separate job category B, it could attempt to
adjust wages to account for the different preferences. Although not as stark as the
example, persistent job segregation makes this a possibility in some workplaces. See
Ariane Hegewisch & Hannah Liepmann, Institute for Women's Policy Research, Fact Sheet:
The Gender Wage Gap by Occupation (Apr. 2010) (reporting that 39.7% of women work in
traditionally female occupations, while 43.6% of men work in traditionally male
occupations). See Jonathan Gruber, The Incidence ofMandated MaternityBenefits, 84 AM.
ECON. REV. 622 (1994) (stating that employers were able to shift most of the costs of
mandated maternity benefits to the workers targeted to receive the benefit).
179. See Craswell,supranote 173 (stating that unless workers' preferences are accurate
and identical, evaluation of the net social benefit of an employment regulation depends on
the redistributional effects between different types of workers).
180. See Leonardi & Pica, supra note 143 (reporting that wage reductions in response
to employment-protection legislation varied based on factors such as length of tenure with
the firm, type of job, and the local unemployment rate).
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result, should be resistant to a race to the bottom. The argument is that
the overall net value created by labor regulation is not that important
because there will be particular firms on the wrong side of the cost-tovalue balance. With globalization, those firms will be able to leave or
threaten to leave, and that will begin the race-to-the-bottom dynamic.
However, this argument simply does not get us very far because nonregulation is inevitably distributional also. To see why, let us play the
same tune backwards. Assume again heterogeneous workers with
women placing a higher value on leave time than men and the employer's cost of providing leave set in between the two valuations. But now
assume a society that does not have labor regulation requiring leave
time. The interesting thing about playing the tune this way is that it
produces the same results but in the opposite direction. Now, without
leave time, employers with female workforces come out behind. Because
of the factors discussed earlier,"s' these employers will not be able to
offer leave time even though their workers would value it more than it
would cost the employer to provide (so there would have been gains to
distribute between employer and workers). Those with male workforces
come out ahead. They are not forced to offer a benefit that would
produce a net loss for them. Those with mixed workforces will come out
somewhere in between but in the opposite direction from the prior
example: those benefited will be those with workforces that tilt male and
vice versa.
In the abstract, this does not point towards a race to the bottom. In
our example, the two approaches to leave time produce different
distributions of costs and benefits and different sets of winners and
losers. For whatever reasons, a society may be more interested in
attending to one set rather than the other. There is no reason to think
it would always favor the set preferring no regulation. Rather, any
additional pressure from globalization could point in either direction-toward the leave-time regulation or away from it.
To the extent there is a bias in one direction or the other, it should be
in the direction of more labor regulation when the regulation produces
net value. By definition, net-value regulation enlarges the pie, so there
can be more winners, larger winners, or both. Thus, if all else is equal,
those types of labor regulation should be favored. Of course, not all else
is likely to be equal. But in the abstract, the bias should be towards
more of this type of regulation. For the same reason, net-cost labor
regulation does not enlarge the pie but makes it smaller, which places
it at risk. Thus, in general terms, the bias will be in favor of net-value
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This is the same
labor and away from net-cost labor regulation."
outcome we expected when we were considering only overall social gains
and losses (although both consequences are filtered through very
uncertain contingencies). The additional complications arising from
worries about distribution do not affect the expected outcome at all.
So far, we have seen that firms will be affected differently by labor
regulation because they have different mixes of employees with different
sets of preferences. Firms will also be affected differently because they
use labor differently and because their compliance costs will differ.
Sticking with our leave-time example, consider a set of firms with mostly
male workforces that all fall on the wrong side of the cost-to-benefit
balance, that is, the requirement imposes a net cost on all the firms.
Despite this similarity, the impact of the leave-time law on the firms
will differ significantly. First, the extent to which the firms rely on
labor may differ significantly. For some firms, labor costs may be 80%
of their overall costs; for other firms, they may be 10%. The impact of
the leave-time requirement on the former firms will be much greater
than the impact on the latter firms. Within either type of firm, the
marginal contribution of any extra costs from the leave-time regulation
is likely to be quite small. Most of a firm's labor costs (whether they
total 80% or 10% of all costs) are unlikely to be significantly affected by
the new leave-time regulation. There are exceptions, but normally those
labor costs will be largely driven by economic factors, such as prevailing
wage rates, rather than changes in regulations.
Second, the costs of compliance are likely to be quite different from
firm to firm. Consider two firms within our set of net-loser firms: a
small five-employee firm and a firm with hundreds of employees. Both
will have to make changes to their rules and procedures to ensure
compliance, and maybe hire a lawyer to help guide them. These costs
are not likely to increase linearly as the number of employees increases;
as a result, it will be effectively cheaper for the larger employer. In
addition, the larger firm should have more flexibility in providing the
required leaves; for example, it might be able to use current employees
to cover vacancies created by the required leaves rather than hire

182. This argument is similar to claims about the efficiency of the common-law. The
basis of these claims is that efficient common-law rules will be challenged less often than
inefficient rules. Thus, the common law will have a bias in that direction because efficient
rules will be more stable. See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication
as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235 (1979); Ramona L. Paetzold & Steven L. Willborn,
The Efficiency of the Common Law Reconsidered, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 157 (1992);

George L. Priest, The Common Law Processand the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL
STUD. 65 (1977); Paul H. Rubin, Why is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51
(1977).
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outsiders who would need more training and orientation. Thus, the
larger firm should also be able to comply more cheaply because each
leave will be less costly."s
Third, the costs will differ from firm to firm because of the ways in
which implementing the leave-time regulation can interact with the rest
of the firms' compensation package. For example, the cost will be
greater for a firm that had no preexisting leave policy than for one that
already offers leaves. At the extreme, an employer that already offers
more leave than required by the regulation would incur no increased
costs. On the other hand, an employer that offers few or no employee
benefits would be limited to making any compensating changes in the
wage rate alone. Because workers are resistant to decreases in nominal
wages,' it may be more difficult for this employer to make compensating changes than an employer that can attempt to make changes in
other benefit programs. Similarly, the absolute magnitude of the cost
increase will be related to the overall level of wages and benefits.
Generally, the higher the level of wages and benefits, the lower this
increase will be as a proportion of total compensation.
Again, the question is how does this set of considerations relate to the
race-to-the-bottom claim? It is simply another way of making the same
point made above. It is true that because employers differ in many
relevant ways, the costs of regulation will be distributed in many and
diverse ways. However, all of these differences in the distribution of
costs are mirrored on the benefit side. The set of employers benefiting
from the leave-time regulation (or any regulation) will also see differing
levels of benefit based on these same kinds of factors. Given this, a
society simply must make a choice on the leave-time regulation issue.
The diverse distributions, while relevant, do not point strongly toward
or against the regulation.
I focused on the set of employers experiencing net costs for a reason.
The race-to-the-bottom claim relies on credible threats of exit by
employers experiencing net costs from labor regulation; actual employer
exit and threats of exit are the underlying sources of the downward
pressure on labor regulation. But the uneven distribution of costs means

183. See Richard Carlson, The Small FirmExemption and the Single Employer Doctrine
in Employment Discrimination Law, 80 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1197 (2006). For an
examination of this concept in another context, see C. Steven Bradford, Does Size Matter?
An Economic Analysis of Small Business Exemptions from Regulation, 8 J. SMALL &
EMERGING Bus. L. 1 (2004). See also Fenwick et al., supra note 99, at 21-36 (considering
and critiquing various approaches used internationally to minimize the impact of labor
laws on small enterprises).
184. See supra note 37.
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that the set of employers who can credibly make such threats is smaller
than the set of employers who suffer net costs. This ability to threaten
to leave depends not only on the existence of net costs, but also on the
magnitude of the increased costs. The net costs from regulation must
not only exist, but must also exceed the costs of exit. This is a complicated equation involving the costs of moving and the costs of regulations
in two different places (the current and future locations) over an
uncertain time period during which regulations may change. It is
possible that even the tiniest increase in net cost from a regulation will
be the proverbial "straw" that tips the balance, but this is more likely to
occur with larger increases.
Finally, firms subject to the new regulation will differ in their
mobility. Some firms will be quite mobile, but there is a significant
subset of firms that cannot credibly threaten to exit because of their
inherent immobility. This would include firms that offer physical local
services such as construction firms and fast-food restaurants."' These
firms can certainly object to costly labor regulation, and their voice may
be significant. However, they cannot back up their claims with credible
threats of exit. Again, one of the main pillars of the race-to-the-bottom
claim is firms' credible threats of exit.
In sum, the basic arguments about the fate of net-value and net-cost
labor regulation in global competition are not significantly altered by
worries about how those benefits are distributed among firms. While
diverse, distributional effects are inevitable, they do not point in any
particular direction on the race-to-the-bottom argument. Even if they
did tend to cut against a particular labor regulation, they may be too
small in magnitude to provide credibility to the threats of exit that are
necessary to fuel the race, or they may fall mostly on firms that are not
in a position to exit anyway.

C. Federal Systems
In federal systems, labor regulation can occur at a national or
subnational (state or local) level. (For ease of reference, I will refer to
subnational legislation as "state" legislation.) When regulation occurs
at a state level, it has already been through a competitive crucible very
similar to the crucible provided by international competition. Thus,
state labor regulation in federal systems should be more resistant to a
race to the bottom than national regulation in federal systems or any
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See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
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regulation in unitary systems. In federal systems, the most susceptible
labor regulation will already have been weeded out. 186
The extent of the buffer against change provided by state labor
regulation depends on the alignment between the pressures of interstate
competition and those of international competition. If the interstate
competition were exactly the same as international competition, then one
should not see any change whatsoever because of global competition.
Similarly, one should not see any change if the state competition is more
vigorous on every dimension than the international competition. Any
race-to-the-bottom pressure should only occur if the international
competition is more vigorous in some way than the interstate competition.
In many ways, interstate competition should be more vigorous than
international competition. As described earlier, any pressure should
arise as firms on the wrong side of certain legislation move or threaten
to move to more hospitable environs. That movement should be easier
across states than across nations: the legal systems are more similar
(indeed, much of it-the federal part-will be the same), the culture will
be less different, the distances may be shorter, there will be no customs
problems, and transferring money and resources will be easier. On the
other hand, a common claim is that international competition is
especially daunting because the scale of the savings may be much
greater. This is usually accompanied with reference to gross wage
differences; for example, in 2011 the average hourly compensation in
manufacturing ranged from $2.01 in the Philippines to $64.15 in Norway
As discussed earlier, this type of
($35.53 in the United States).'
gross comparison is not how decisions will be made; the actual comparisons will involve much smaller gross differences. The overall balance of
competitiveness across states versus across countries is uncertain, but
there are many reasons to believe that the interstate competition will

186. This claim-that state legislation in federal systems is less susceptible to a race
to the bottom-is analogous to another structural argument that could be forwarded to cast
doubt on the race-to-the-bottom claim. The argument is that the style of labor regulation
in a particular country is a consequence of that country's legal origin as a common-law or
civil-law country. To the extent this is true, efficiency-based accounts of the consequences
of labor regulation, such as the ones discussed in this Article, become less important. Juan
C. Botero et al., The Regulation ofLabor, 119 Q.J. EcON. 1339 (2004). Although this thesis
is consistent with the skepticism of this Article about the race to the bottom, I do not have
space to discuss it here.
187. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS OF HOURLY
COMPENSATION COSTS IN MANUFACTURING, 2011 TABLE 1 (2012), available at http/www.
bls.gov/news.release/ichcc.toc.htm.
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prepare state legislation well for any subsequent international competition.
Of course, not all labor legislation in a federal system is state
legislation. Federal laws in federal systems will not have gone through
the competitive crucible of state legislation. At the margin, one would
expect globalization to have more effect on federal legislation than on
state legislation. Stated differently, to the extent globalization exerts
pressure for change in labor regulation, one might expect to see about
the same change in federal legislation in federal systems as one sees in
legislation in unitary systems, and both will be marginally greater
changes than one would see in state legislation in federal systems.
Consequently, the overall effect of globalization in federal systems will
also depend on the amount and type of labor legislation that is federal
or state. Viewed in this way, another interesting by-product of
globalization may be a shift in federal systems from federal to state
labor legislation. Empirically, if the race-to-the-bottom claim has
viability, one ought to see greater downward movement in federal than
in state labor legislation. In the United States, the balance between
state and federal legislation is driven mainly by historical circumstance,
but the balance is affected by many things." At the margin, however,
globalization provides one more reason to prefer state to federal labor
legislation. State legislation provides a within-country, self-monitoring
mechanism that disciplines legislatures and, as a result, helps to
minimize changes resulting from globalization pressures.
V.

CONCLUSION

The claim that globalization will result in a race to the bottom is
firmly entrenched in American labor-law scholarship. This is somewhat
surprising because empirical support for the claim is quite weak, and,
even more so, because acceptance of the claim implies a view of labor
regulation that is outside the academic mainstream-that labor
regulation always imposes net costs. On the other hand, maybe the
dominance of the race-to-the-bottom claim is not so surprising given that
the narrative supporting it is powerful, intuitive, oft-repeated, and, until
now, virtually unchallenged.
Whatever causes it, this consensus on the race-to-the-bottom claim has
important implications for labor policy. For example, it weakens calls
for aggressive labor regulation by validating the claim that such
regulation is futile because it will simply hasten the movement of
employers to lower-regulation jurisdictions. The claim also strengthens

188. See WILLBORN ET AL., supra note 85, at 3-4.
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the notion that the labor market is just like any other market and, as
such, better left alone. Why search for particular flaws in the labor
market that might be corrected or important values of human flourishing and dignity that might be addressed if the race to the bottom
renders impossible any effective legal response?
This Article challenges the dominant narrative supporting a race to
the bottom in labor law. It supplies narratives that support the
empirical literature-that there may not be much of a race at all and,
even if there is, it may not be as fast and sudden as advertised. The
Article certainly does not prove that there is never a race to the bottom.
However, it does demonstrate that there are plausible, alternative
narratives to the dominant one. A narrative skeptical of the race-to-thebottom hypothesis may help to recalibrate the scales used to consider
labor regulation. If we believe in a race to the bottom a bit less, we may
be empowered to think more deeply and creatively about the promise
and possibilities of effective labor regulation.

